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I. Introduction 
Predicting large-scale defaults in the municipal bond 
market,1 Warren Buffet—one of the nation’s shrewdest 
investors—terminated Berkshire Hathaway’s credit default 
swaps in 2012, which insured $8.25 million in municipal debt.2 
Buffet’s move out of the municipal bond market should signal 
that the once “sleepy”3 market is no longer as risk-free as it 
previously has been.4 Earlier, in 2010, risk analyst Meredith 
Whitney also forecasted that “50 to 100 sizeable defaults totaling 
hundreds of billions of dollars” would occur in the municipal bond 
market.5 These predictions were not unfounded.6 Defaults are on 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Philip Grommet, A Call for Action: An Analysis of the Impending 
Regulatory Crisis in the Municipal Securities Market, 38 J. LEGIS. 237, 239 
(2012) (noting that Warren Buffett warns of municipal debt risk). 
 2. See Gregory J. Wallace, Could Municipal Bonds Be the Next Financial 
Titanic?, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2012, 11:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
forbesleadershipforum/2012/09/20/could-municipal-bonds-be-the-next-financial-
titanic/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2015) (noting that when Warren Buffet “pulls back 
from a major market, attention must be paid”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Lisa Anne Hamilton, Canary in the Coal Mine: Can the Campaign 
for Mandatory Climate Risk Disclosure Withstand the Municipal Bond Market’s 
Resistance to Regulatory Reform?, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1014, 1019 (2010) 
(“What was, a century ago, a sleepy backwater market is now a startlingly large 
municipal bond market . . . .”). 
 4. See Wallace, supra note 2 (explaining that the municipal bond market 
has shown signs of stress and providing examples). 
 5. See Grommet, supra note 1, at 238–39 (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted) (discussing municipal bond analysts prediction of a rise in 
defaults). 
 6. See Wallace, supra note 2 (providing that the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York reported 2,366 defaults between 1986 and 2011). 
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the rise.7 Municipal bankruptcies, like those in Jefferson County, 
Alabama, and Detroit, Michigan, have forced the municipal bond 
market into the headlines.8 The municipal bond market is no 
longer the “mom and apple pie of financial markets, wholesome, 
enduring, and unexciting.”9 
The increase in the perceived risk of municipal securities has 
led to a corresponding increase in the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) regulation of the municipal securities 
market.10 For example, West Clark Community Schools (West 
Clark) made headlines in July 2013 when the SEC charged the 
school district with falsely claiming that it had been compliant 
with annual financial disclosures.11 The West Clark charges 
represent the SEC’s first foray into punishing a municipal issuer 
for falsely claiming in an official offering statement that the 
issuer was fully compliant with previous annual disclosures.12 
                                                                                                     
 7. See id. (discussing how the municipal bond market “has been showing 
signs of stress”).  
 8. See Nathan Bomey, Brent Snavely & Alisa Priddle, Detroit Becomes 
Largest U.S. City to Enter Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (Dec. 3, 2014, 7:53 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/03/detroit-bankruptcy-
eligibility/3849833/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (discussing Detroit’s Chapter 9 
bankruptcy filing and providing that Detroit has “an estimated $18 billion in 
debt and long-term liabilities”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); William Selway, Martin Braun & Margaret Newkirk, Alabama County 
Votes to Declare Biggest Municipal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Nov. 9, 
2011, 6:49 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-11-09/alabama-s-
jefferson-county-votes-for-biggest-municipal-bankruptcy-in-u-s- (last visited Oct. 
22, 2015) (discussing Jefferson County’s bankruptcy and stating that the 
county’s bankruptcy eclipses Orange County, California’s record-setting 
bankruptcy in 1994) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); SEC, 
REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 25 (2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf [hereinafter SEC 
REPORT] (providing a list of high profile municipality bankruptcies). 
 9. See Wallace, supra note 2 (discussing how the rise of municipalities 
facing financial stress could lead the way for more bond defaults).  
 10. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges School District and Muni Bond 
Underwriter in Indiana with Defrauding Investors (July 29, 2013) (discussing 
the SEC’s charge against West Clark Community Schools). 
 11. See id. (noting that the SEC’s charge against the school district was for 
“falsely stating to bond investors that the school district had been properly 
providing annual financing information and notices required as part of its prior 
bond offerings”).  
 12. See id. (“This is the first time the SEC has charged a municipal issuer 
with falsely claiming in a bond offering’s official statement that it was fully 
compliant with the annual disclosure obligations it agreed to in prior 
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According to the SEC, West Clark defrauded investors by leading 
them to believe it complied with the disclosure requirements for a 
prior offering; in fact, however, the school district failed to file 
any annual reports or event notices for its 2005 bond offering.13  
Access to accurate and adequate information mitigates 
market risks for investors.14 Investors use information about 
securities to evaluate and value the securities’ prices and risks.15 
The need for this information raises the question, what 
information do investors need? Too much information may be 
cumbersome for investors, but material information allows 
investors to value securities’ prices and risks.16 In the municipal 
bond market, Rule 15c2–1217 establishes the minimum requisite 
material information for issuers to provide in their continuing 
disclosure agreements with underwriters.18  
Even with Rule 15c2–12 in effect, investors still lack access 
to this information.19 West Clark’s non-compliance does not 
appear to be a unique event; actually, failure to provide annual 
reports or continuing disclosures appears commonplace among 
municipal issuers.20 In response to the lack of compliance with 
                                                                                                     
offerings . . . .”).  
 13. See id. (“[F]or five years [West Clark Community Schools] failed to 
submit the required [annual financial] information.”). 
 14. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN 
A NUTSHELL 38, 111 (9th ed. 2006) (noting that the purposes of the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are “[assuring] the public 
availability of adequate information”). 
 15. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 56 (“To gauge the credit risk of 
different types of municipal securities, analysts and investors historically have 
needed information on the type of issuer and credit involved.”). 
 16. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2015) (preventing issuers of securities from 
omitting material facts when making statements).  
 17. See id. § 240.15c2–12 (governing continuing disclosures for municipal 
bonds). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 65 (“[I]nvestors and other market 
participants have emphasized a need for greater and timelier disclosure in 
several key areas.”). 
 20. See Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative, SEC, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/municipalities-continuing-disclosure-
cooperation-initiative.shtml (last updated Nov. 13, 2014) (last visited Nov. 22, 
2015) [hereinafter MCDC] (explaining that noncompliance with continuing 
disclosures is “potentially widespread” among issuers) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also NAT’L FED’N OF MUN. ANALYSTS, 
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Rule 15c2–12, the SEC issued the Municipalities Continuing 
Disclosure Cooperating Initiative (MCDC Initiative) in March 
2014.21 The MCDC Initiative incentivizes municipal underwriters 
and issuers to self-report “material” violations of Rule 15c2–12.22 
To comply with the MCDC Initiative, municipal issuers must look 
back to previous disclosures. Not only do issuers need to know 
what is material going forward, but they also need to determine 
what was previously material.23 Thus, issuers and underwriters 
must understand the concept of materiality because it is the key 
to ensuring compliance with the MCDC Initiative.24 Despite the 
importance of material disclosures, the SEC has not defined 
materiality in the context of Rule 15c2–12.25  
This Note explores materiality’s meaning in the context of 
Rule 15c2–12’s continuing disclosure requirements. Within the 
framework of Rule 15c2–12 and the municipal bond market, this 
Note argues that the correct meaning of materiality uses a 
                                                                                                     
NFMA RELEASES RESULTS OF DISCLOSURE SURVEY (2002), http://www. 
nfma.org/assets/documents/disclosure_survey.pdf [hereinafter NFMA 
DISCLOSURE SURVEY] (providing data from an informal survey of issuers subject 
to the continuing disclosure requirements and the completeness or 
inadequateness of their filed continuing disclosures); PETER J. SCHMITT, DPC 
DATA, ESTIMATING MUNICIPAL SECURITIES CONTINUING DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE: 
A LITMUS TEST APPROACH 4 (2008), http://www.dpcdata.com/research/ 
[hereinafter SCHMITT, LITMUS TEST APPROACH] (analyzing issuers’ compliance 
with required continuing disclosures under Rule 15c2–12 between 1996 and 
2005); PETER J. SCHMITT, DPC DATA, RECENT TRENDS IN MUNICIPAL CONTINUING 
DISCLOSURE ACTIVITIES 4 (2011), http://www.dpcdata.com/research/ [hereinafter 
SCHMITT, RECENT TRENDS] (examining recent trends in municipal bond issuers’ 
continuing disclosure activities).  
 21. See MCDC, supra note 20 (discussing the MCDC Initiative’s 
background and requirements).  
 22. See id. (discussing how the MCDC Initiative is in response to concern 
about poor disclosure practices). 
 23. See id. (requiring disclosure of past violations of Rule 15c2–12). 
 24. See id. (explaining that issuers and underwriters should self-report any 
material violations of prior disclosures within the past five years). 
 25. See GFOA Alert: The SEC MCDC Initiative and Issuers, GOV. FIN. 
OFFICERS ASS’N (July 7, 2014), http://gfoa.org/gfoa-alert-sec-mcdc-initiative-and-
issuers (last visited Sept. 18, 2014) [hereinafter GFOA Alert] (noting the SEC 
will not define “material,” instead evaluating material violations on case-by-case 
basis in the MCDC Initiative) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); see also NAT’L FED’N OF MUN. ANALYSTS, WHITE PAPER ON FEDERAL 
SECURITIES LAW RELATING TO MUNICIPAL SECURITIES 17 (2008) [hereinafter 
NFMA WHITE PAPER] (discussing that the qualification of event disclosure, if 
material, “leaves much room for debate”).  
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creditworthiness test, which dictates that a fact, event, or 
omission is material if it substantially affects the issuer’s 
creditworthiness or ability to meet its obligations to 
bondholders.26 Part II provides background information on the 
current municipal bond regulatory scheme and discusses the 
MCDC Initiative. Part III explores different meanings of 
materiality in the securities context. Part IV analyzes these 
meanings of materiality in the context of the municipal bond 
market and argues that the correct definition of materiality 
should depend on creditworthiness. Finally, Part V applies this 
meaning of materiality in the context of Rule 15c2–12.  
II. Current Municipal Bond Regulatory Scheme 
A. Municipal Bonds Primer 
To provide context for the issue of materiality in the 
municipal bond continuing disclosures requirements, an 
introduction to municipal bonds, municipal issuers, and 
municipal underwriters is necessary. Governmental entities, like 
states, cities, and counties, issue municipal bonds, or debt 
securities, to provide funding for capital projects and day-to-day 
obligations.27 Essentially, a bond provides a loan to a 
municipality, and the municipality must pay the principal on that 
loan when it matures (and interest until it does so).28 Municipal 
bonds differ from corporate bonds because they usually involve 
                                                                                                     
26. See infra Part IV.E (arguing that the correct materiality standard 
should be a creditworthiness test). 
 27. See Investor Bulletin: Municipal Bonds, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/ 
investor/alerts/municipalbonds.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter 
SEC Investor Bulletin] (presenting information on municipal bonds for investor 
education) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also SEC 
REPORT, supra note 8, at i (providing that government entities issue bonds to 
finance private and public projects and to provide cash flow). 
 28. See SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (explaining that investors 
receive regular interest payments and, at maturity, the original investment); 
JOEL G. SIEGEL & JAE K. SHIM, INVESTMENTS: A SELF-TEACHING GUIDE 6 (1986) 
(noting that a bondholder typically receives the interest payments semi-
annually). 
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less risk of default,29 are exempt from federal income tax,30 and in 
the case of default, are more likely to be repaid.31  
Three types of municipal bonds exist: general obligation 
bonds,32 revenue bonds,33 and short-term debt securities.34 
General obligation bonds are backed by the issuer’s “full faith and 
credit,” meaning the issuer can tax residents to provide revenue 
for repayment of the bonds.35 Revenue bonds are used to fund 
specific projects.36 Unlike general obligation bonds, the specific 
project’s revenue repays the revenue bonds’ obligations.37 Conduit 
bonds are a special form of revenue bonds, and municipalities 
issue them on behalf of a third party.38 As its name indicates, 
short-term debt securities mature quickly, within thirteen 
months.39 These securities provide funds for the gap in “time 
when expenses occur and when [other] revenues become 
                                                                                                     
 29. See TOM LYDON, TRENDS IN FIXED INCOME: INVESTING IN BONDS 17 (2010) 
(noting that municipal bonds have lower rates of default). 
 30. See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2012) (excluding interest on municipal bonds 
from gross income); SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (discussing that 
municipal bonds are generally not subject to federal income taxation); SEC 
REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (noting that the bond’s interest is usually exempt 
from federal income taxation and possibly exempt from state income taxation). 
 31. See LYDON, supra note 29, at 20 (discussing that municipal bond 
investors have a higher recovery for defaulted municipal bonds than corporate 
securities). 
 32. See SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (providing that general 
obligation bonds “are backed by the ‘full faith and credit’ of the issuer, which has 
the power to tax residents to pay bondholders”); see also Hamilton, supra note 3, 
at 1017–18 (describing the types of municipal bonds). 
 33. See SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (explaining that revenue 
bonds are repaid through revenue raised from a specific project, such as 
highway tolls, and in the event that revenue ceases from the project, purchasers 
“do not have a claim on the underlying revenue source”); see also Hamilton, 
supra note 3, at 1017–18 (describing revenue bonds). 
 34. See JUDY WESALO TEMEL, THE BOND MKT. ASS’N, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF 
MUNICIPAL BONDS 33–34 (5th ed. 2001) (explaining short-term debt securities). 
 35. See SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (describing general obligation 
bonds). 
 36. See id. (explaining revenue bonds). 
 37. See id. (describing the differences between general obligation bonds and 
revenue bonds). 
 38. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1017–18 (noting that conduit bonds are 
“typically used to finance construction or manufacturing for certain industrial-
type facilities”). For a discussion on the types of municipal bonds, see id.  
 39. See TEMEL, supra note 34, at 33–34 (describing short-term securities). 
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available.”40 General obligation bonds and revenue bonds, 
however, remain the most common.41  
Issuers and underwriters are the players involved in the 
municipal bond process. The issuer—the governmental entity—
sells the bonds to the underwriter.42 Neither the SEC nor the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) can require 
municipal bond issuers to file any document in connection with a 
bond offering.43 An underwriter functions as the municipal bond 
dealer by purchasing the municipal bonds from the issuer and 
selling them to investors.44 Thus, the underwriter serves as the 
middleman between the issuer and investors.45  
B. The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
and the Tower Amendment 
Despite the municipal bond market’s size and necessity, the 
federal regulatory scheme is limited compared to other 
U.S. capital markets.46 The Securities Act of 
                                                                                                     
 40. See id. at 33 (discussing the purpose of short-term securities). 
 41. See SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 27 (explaining that the two most 
common bond types are general obligation bonds and revenue bonds). 
 42. See Bonds, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bonds.htm (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2014) (explaining that investors lend money to “a government, 
municipality, corporation, federal agency or other entity” when they buy bonds) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1)–(2) (2012) (prohibiting both the SEC and 
MSRB from requiring a municipal issuer to file any documents before issuing a 
bond or providing any documents to the SEC, the MSRB, or a purchaser). The 
municipal bond market receives exemption from the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 due to constitutional dual-sovereignty 
issues. See Grommet, supra note 1, at 245, 247 n.67 (discussing the municipal 
bond regulatory regime and noting that Congress believed “constitutional dual-
sovereignty issues would arise if municipal securities were subjected to federal 
regulation”). 
 44. See How the Market Works, MUN. SECS. RULEMAKING BD., 
http://www.msrb.org/Municipal-Bond-Market/How-the-Market-Works.aspx (last 
visited June 25, 2014) (describing the underwriting process) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 45. See id. (explaining that the underwriter buys the bonds from the 
issuers and then sells the bonds to investors). 
 46. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii–iii (discussing the lack of statutory 
authority in the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
the Tower Amendment to promulgate disclosure standards for municipal 
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193347 (Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 193448 
(Exchange Act) exempt municipal bonds from regulation.49 These 
Acts originally exempted municipal bonds based on the belief that 
municipal bonds involved low risk and “little opportunity for 
creative fraud.”50 Nevertheless, antifraud provisions of 
Section 17(a)51 of the Securities Act and Section 10(b)52 of the 
Exchange Act apply to municipal bonds.53 Section 17(a) prevents 
fraud and manipulation in securities’ offerings, or the primary 
market.54 Similarly, Section 10(b) prohibits fraud and 
manipulation in the secondary market.55 
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act has always applied to the 
municipal bond market because Section 17(a) applies to 
“persons,” which by definition includes governments.56 In 1975 
the Tower Amendment applied Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 
to the municipal bond market in response to New York City’s 
“near municipal bond default.”57 These antifraud provisions 
prevent “any person[] from making an untrue statement of 
material fact, or omitting any material facts necessary to 
                                                                                                     
issuers). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
 48. Id. §§ 78a–78pp. 
 49. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (providing that the municipal 
securities market is not subject to the same level of regulation as other 
securities markets, but antifraud provisions apply to the municipal securities 
market); see also Grommet, supra note 1, at 247 n.67 (“These exemptions 
reflected a congressional belief that constitutional dual-sovereignty issues would 
arise if municipal securities were subjected to federal regulation.”). 
 50. ROBERT DEAN POPE, MAKING GOOD DISCLOSURE: THE ROLE AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES 
LAWS 5 (2001). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012). 
 52. Id. § 78j(b). 
 53. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (noting municipal bonds have broad 
exemptions from the Securities Act and the Exchange Act but are not exempt 
from the antifraud provisions of these acts).  
 54. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).  
 55. Id. § 78j(b). 
 56. See Grommet, supra note 1, at 247 n.68 (discussing Section 17(a) of the 
Securities Act and its applicability to municipal bonds). 
 57. See id. at 247–48 (describing the effect of New York’s near default on 
municipal bond regulation). 
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statements made, . . . in connection with the offer, purchase, or 
sale of any securities.”58 
Further, the Tower Amendment prohibits the SEC or the 
MSRB from requiring municipal issuers to file disclosures before 
municipal offerings.59 Specifically, the SEC and the MSRB cannot 
require an issuer to file “any application, report, or document in 
connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such 
securities.”60 The MSRB also cannot require an issuer to provide 
to the MSRB or a purchaser “any application, report, document, 
or information with respect to such issuer.”61 
But, the MSRB may require a municipal securities dealer, 
broker, or advisor to provide the MSRB or any purchasers with 
information about the issuer that “is generally available from a 
source other than such issuer.”62 This provision permits the 
MSRB to regulate underwriters, dealers, brokers, and advisors 
directly and to regulate issuers indirectly.63 The Securities Act, 
the Exchange Act, and the Tower Amendment therefore only 
restrict direct regulation of municipal bond issuers.64  
C. Rule 15c2–12 
Rule 15c2–12 regulates municipal bond disclosures.65 The 
Rule purports to “stimulate greater scrutiny by underwriters of 
the representations made by issuers and the circumstances 
surrounding the offering.”66 The SEC adopted Rule 15c2–12 “to 
                                                                                                     
 58. SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 29. 
 59. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(d)(1)–(2) (2012) (prohibiting the SEC or MSRB 
from requiring an issuer to file any documents before issuing a bond or 
providing any documents to the SEC, the MSRB, or a purchaser). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. § 78o-4(d)(2). 
 62. Id. 
 63. See POPE, supra note 50, at 7 (noting that the Tower Amendment does 
not prevent indirect regulation of issuers). 
 64. See NFMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 6 (discussing the effect of 
the federal securities law on municipal securities). 
 65. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12 (2014) (providing municipal securities 
disclosure requirements). 
 66. Municipal Securities Disclosure Proposed Rule, SEC Release No. 34-
26100, 53 Fed. Reg. 37,779 (Sept. 28, 1988). 
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enhance the quality and timeliness of disclosures in the 
municipal market.”67 Overall, the SEC designed the rule to 
ensure “the market [receives] certain specified information that 
in the past it did not receive, either at all or on a timely basis.”68 
This Rule indirectly regulates issuers because no 
underwriter could purchase bonds from an issuer without an 
official statement.69 Without an underwriter, a municipality 
would have to sell its securities directly to the public; this 
prospect is not feasible for most municipal issuers.70 Further, an 
underwriter cannot purchase or sell municipal bonds unless the 
“[u]nderwriter has reasonably determined that an issuer” will 
provide notice within ten business days of the occurrence of 
specified events.71 These events reflect on the issuer’s financial 
condition, tax status, modifications to bondholders’ rights, and 
other key features relating to the bond issue; some of these events 
require disclosure only if the occurrence is material.72 To ensure 
that these disclosures are properly disseminated to the market, 
                                                                                                     
 67. Statement of the Commission Regarding Disclosure Obligations of 
Municipal Securities Issuers and Others, Interpretive Release Nos. 33-7049, 34-
33741, 59 Fed. Reg. 12,748, 12,749 (Mar. 17, 1994) [hereinafter SEC 
Interpretive Release]. 
 68. POPE, supra note 50, at 64.   
 69. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(1) (requiring underwriters to “obtain 
and review an [issuer’s] official statement” before purchasing, offering, or selling 
the security); see also POPE, supra note 50, at 8 (noting that “an issuer cannot 
practically sell bonds in a public offering without an official statement”). 
 70. See Alan Walter Seiss, Local Government Finance: Capital Facilities 
Planning and Debt Administration, UNIV. OF MICH., http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~steiss/page68.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (“Most 
investors cannot afford to buy whole bond issues, and most local governments do 
not have the time or resources to market bonds to multiple investors.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 71. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i) (2014) (delineating the 
underwriters’ responsibilities for municipal bond offerings). 
 72. See id. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C) (listing the events that must be 
disclosed upon occurrence within ten business days). The events that must be 
disclosed, if material, are as follows: non-payment related defaults, any material 
events affect the bond’s tax status, modifications to bondholders’ rights, bond 
calls, release, substitution, or sale of any property securing the bond’s 
repayment, entry into or termination of a definitive agreement to undertake a 
merger, consolidation, or acquisition involving an obligated person, the sale of 
all or substantially all assets not in the ordinary course of business, and 
appointment of successor or additional trustee, or change in the trustee’s name. 
Id. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14). 
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the underwriter and the issuer usually enter into a continuing 
disclosure agreement under which the issuer agrees to provide 
the information that Rule 15c2–12 requires and, on occasion, 
more information that the underwriter requested.73 Thus, by 
requiring underwriters first to determine that issuers will 
provide continuing disclosures, the SEC and MSRB indirectly 
require issuers to provide continuing disclosures.74 
The current municipal bond market regulatory scheme 
possesses several flaws. First, compared to other U.S. capital 
markets, the federal regulatory scheme is limited.75 Once known 
as a sleepy market, the municipal bond market “has outgrown 
[the] restrictions of the regulatory structure put into place 
decades ago.”76 Second, the Tower Amendment regime “created a 
complicated set of disclosure rules without enforcement, and 
regulations that [do not] directly address the issuers responsible 
for the disclosure.”77 In theory, the issuer, following its continuing 
disclosure agreement, provides financial disclosures in the official 
statement at the time of the offer and provides continuing 
disclosures until the bond matures.78 The reality, however, does 
not reflect this theory.79 Even former SEC Chairman Christopher 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i) (requiring that an underwriter and issuer 
enter into a written agreement or contract that the issuer will provide certain 
information to the MSRB). For examples of the kind of content made available 
through continuing disclosure agreements, see http://www.msrb.org/Market-
Transparency/Continuing-Disclsoure.aspx. 
 74. See § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i) (requiring underwriters to “reasonably 
determine” that issuers will provide annual and continuing disclosures); POPE, 
supra note 50, at 57 (noting that Rule 15c2–12 is “an underwriter conduct 
rule[,]” but unavoidable to an issuer if it wants “to sell its bonds in a public 
offering”).   
 75. See POPE, supra note 50, at ii–iii (discussing the lack of statutory 
authority in the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Tower Amendment to 
promulgate disclosure standards for municipal issuers). 
 76. Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1019.  
 77. Id. at 1023. 
 78. See SCHMITT, LITMUS TEST APPROACH, supra note 20, at 8 (“As designed 
by the SEC, the disclosure sequence for each issue would start with the final 
official statement and continue with operating and financial disclosures 
annually for as long as the issue remained outstanding.”).  
 79. See id. (providing that the data illustrated that “the inflow of 
continuing disclosure filings was not consistent with the rate of new issuance 
growth in the overall market”). 
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Cox stated that continuing disclosures are “technically 
voluntary.”80 
In 2010 and 2011, the SEC conducted field hearings to discuss 
continuing disclosures for municipal bonds.81 One panelist raised 
three issues with the continuing disclosures: (1) timeliness, 
(2) frequency, and (3) completeness.82 Data collected from several 
studies on municipal bond continuing disclosures supports the 
prevalence of these three issues.83  
The timeliness and frequency of continuing disclosures are 
closely related. In 2008, DPC Data conducted a study, which 
revealed that over 50% of bonds outstanding for nine years or more 
have one year or more of disclosure delinquency.84 More than 25% of 
those bonds are in chronic delinquency, missing three years or more 
of disclosures.85 As the bond’s age increases, the likelihood of 
delinquency increases.86 Further, these statistics suggest that 
chronic delinquency disclosure behavior becomes ingrained in 
issuers over time.87 A common practice exists among issuers of filing 
multiple delinquent disclosures just before a new bond issue.88 By 
                                                                                                     
 80. Id. at 4. But, if continuing disclosures under Rule 15c2–12 were 
voluntary, then the MCDC Initiative would not have much strength. 
 81. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at i (noting that the public field 
hearings occurred in San Francisco, California, Washington, D.C., and 
Birmingham, Alabama). 
 82. See id. at 65 n.384 (discussing that disclosure problems fall into three 
categories).  
 83. See NFMA DISCLOSURE SURVEY, supra note 20 (surveying around 100 
issuers subject to the continuing disclosure requirements to evaluate “the 
quality and completeness of information being provided”); PETER J. SCHMITT, 
DPC DATA, CONSEQUENCES OF POOR DISCLOSURE ENFORCEMENT IN MUNICIPAL 
SECURITIES MARKET 4 (2009), http://www.dpcdata.com/research/ [hereinafter 
SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES] (studying the effectiveness of the SEC and MSRB in 
regulating and enforcing regulations in the municipal bond market); SCHMITT, 
LITMUS TEST APPROACH, supra note 20, at 7 (conducting a study of issuers 
subject to continuing disclosure requirements and their compliance with the 
requirements from 1996 to 2005); SCHMITT, RECENT TRENDS, supra note 20, at 5–
6 (analyzing recent trends in issuers’ disclosure habits). 
 84. SCHMITT, LITMUS TEST APPROACH, supra note 20, at 7. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. at 16 (providing a graph illustrating the sample bonds’ chronic 
delinquencies as percentages). 
 88. See id. (noting that issuers only made up for missed or late filings “in 
advance of new bond issues”).  
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the time issuers actually file these delinquent disclosures, however, 
the financial information becomes essentially useless.89 Despite 
“over 42,000 unique” issuers bringing at least one bond issue to 
market, documents filed for unique issuers amounted to “just 
over 33,000” from 1997 to 2005.90 
The completeness of continuing disclosures also leaves 
something to be desired. In a 2002 survey, the National 
Federation of Municipal Analysts (NFMA) found that, while 
“59.1% of annual financial information was found to be complete 
or near complete[,] . . . 40.9% of annual financial information was 
found to be somewhat inadequate or substantially inadequate.”91 
As a result, even if an issuer files a continuing disclosure, many 
disclosures do not provide sufficient or complete information.92  
This tardiness, delinquency, and incompleteness frustrates 
the purposes of disclosures. Disclosures prevent fraud, deception, 
and manipulation;93 provide a true valuation of a bond’s price on 
the secondary market;94 and “give investors an accurate and 
complete picture of the risks they are taking in buying an issuer’s 
bonds.”95 Continuing disclosures also provide critical information 
occurring after the bond’s issuance96 and affect transparency of a 
                                                                                                     
 89. See SCHMITT, RECENT TRENDS, supra note 20, at 17 (stating that “[i]f you 
consider financial statement filings more than 180 days past the [Fiscal Year-
End] date to be too stale,” then 72% of issuers in the sample filed stale 
disclosures). 
 90. SCHMITT, LITMUS TEST APPROACH, supra note 20, at 8.  
 91. NFMA DISCLOSURE SURVEY, supra note 20.  
 92. See id. (discussing the inadequacy of continuing disclosures filed). 
 93. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(a) (2014) (providing that an underwriter 
shall not act as an underwriter unless the underwriter complies with this 
Section for the purpose of preventing “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative 
acts or practice”).  
 94. See BALLARD SPAHR, MATERIALITY UNDER THE MCDC INITIATIVE: CAN 
THE SEC PROVE ITS CASE? 14–21 (2014), http://www.ballardspahr.com/events 
news/events/~/media/files/events/eventmaterials/2014-08-07-materiality-under-
the-mc dc-initiative.ashx (last visited Jan. 4, 2015) (hypothesizing the price 
effect on a bond when an issuer reported a cut in state funding that significantly 
reduced funding).  
 95. POPE, supra note 50, at 83. 
 96. See How the Market Works, supra note 44 (noting that continuing 
disclosures provide investors important information after the bond’s offering); 
SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii–iii, 69 (discussing that disclosures give issuers 
critical information for assessing an issuer’s financial condition and whether an 
issuer will be able to repay its obligations). 
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bond’s creditworthiness in the secondary market.97 Finally, 
continuing disclosures allow investors to analyze their 
investments.98 These purposes cannot be accomplished when an 
issuer files disclosures just before a subsequent bond offering, 
fails to file any disclosures, or files incomplete disclosures.99 
Continuing disclosures are especially important in the 
municipal bond market.100 Lack of disclosures creates more risk 
for investors.101 Credit determinants affecting the municipal bond 
market “usually [do not] manifest in sudden shifts that lead 
immediately to distress.”102 This stability can also be attributed 
to issuers “operat[ing] on a more stable economic platform” when 
compared to corporations.103 Thus, continuing disclosures are 
important to provide warning of financial deterioration.104 The 
MSRB summarizes the importance of continuing disclosures: 
This information generally would reflect the financial or 
operating condition of the issuer as it changes over time, as 
well as specific events occurring after issuance that can have 
an impact on the ability of the issuer to pay amounts owing on 
the bond, the value of the bond if it is bought or sold prior to 
                                                                                                     
 97. See SCHMITT, LITMUS TEST APPROACH, supra note 20, at 4 (explaining 
that continuing disclosures “affect[] credit transparency of bonds in the 
secondary market”). 
 98. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 69 (discussing how investors can 
analyze their investments from disclosures). 
 99. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES: OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING CONTINUING 
DISCLOSURE 10 (2012) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (providing that continuing 
disclosures are released too long after the end of the fiscal year for the 
information to be useful and that practically the information becomes stale). 
 100. See Martha Mahan Haines, SEC, Disclosure in the Municipal Market: 
Fundamental Concepts for Issuers (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/spch400.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2015) (“Disclosure defines the 
information age in municipal securities.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 101. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 4 (discussing that 
investors may buy distressed bonds, but they have no available information 
indicating such distress because of delinquency with continuing disclosures).  
 102. Id. at 10.  
 103. Id. at 10–11. 
 104. See id. at 11 (discussing that timely and regularly filed disclosures can 
provide warning of financial deterioration).  
2004 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1989 (2015) 
its maturity, the timing of repayment of principal, and any 
number of other key features of the bond.105 
Further, the SEC and the MSRB have poorly enforced the 
disclosure requirements.106 Before the Dodd–Frank Act of 
2010,107 the MSRB’s board of directors faced an inherent conflict 
itself because members of the municipal dealer and bank dealer 
communities comprised two-thirds of the board.108 Before 
implementing Electronic Municipal Market Access109 (EMMA), 
“[n]either the SEC nor the MSRB monitored disclosure 
compliance in the [National Recognized Municipal Securities 
Information Repository (NRMSIR)].”110 Even with the use of 
EMMA, the MSRB’s ability to monitor missing or late disclosures 
remains limited.111 This lack of scrutiny of continuing disclosures 
set the stage “for the worst possible predatory behavior to take 
place in distressed bonds.”112 Dual sovereignty between the 
federal, state, and local governments also leads to poor 
                                                                                                     
 105. How the Market Works, supra note 44.  
 106. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 15 (explaining that the 
lack of SEC and MSRB enforcement “has created a no-penalty environment that 
leaves gaping holes in the disclosure fabric of the market”).  
 107. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also Grommet, supra note 1, at 254 
(“Rule[] 15c2–12 . . . [does] not expressly provide a noncompliance remedy.”); 
U.S. Financial Reform: Municipal Securities, DUANE MORRIS, http://www.duane 
morris.com/alerts/financial_reform_municipal_securities_3773.html (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2015) (providing that the Dodd–Frank Act amends the MSRB board so 
that the majority of board members “[will be] independent of municipal 
securities brokers, dealers[,] or advisors”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 108. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 16 (noting that one of 
the problems with the MSRB’s enforcement of continuing disclosures may come 
from the Board members and the Board’s composition). 
 109. The Electronic Municipal Market Access is the EDGAR-equivalent for 
municipal issuers. Compare EMMA, Electronic Municipal Market Access, MUN. 
SECS. RULEMAKING BD., http://www.emma.msrb.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2015) 
(providing a search tool for municipal bonds and disclosures) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review), with EDGAR, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html (last visited Oct. 8, 
2015) (providing a search tool for public company filings) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 110. SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 12. 
 111. See GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 18 (explaining that the MSRB lacks 
the ability to track which issuances have missed or filed late disclosures). 
 112. SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 11. 
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enforcement.113 Overall, lack of enforcement has bred indifference 
to filing continuing disclosures.114 
Last, issuers have not faced direct legal consequences for 
failing to file continuing disclosures.115 While underwriters could 
sue for specific performance as a breach of the continuing 
disclosure agreement, the remedy would be that the issuer files 
the continuing disclosure.116 Thus, underwriters have no 
incentive to pursue this remedy.117  
D. Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative 
Prompted by the widespread noncompliance with Rule 15c2–
12, the SEC issued the MCDC Initiative in March 2014.118 The 
Initiative incentivizes both issuers and underwriters to self-
report “possible violations involving material[ly] inaccurate 
statements” related to the continuing disclosures in bond offering 
documents.119 Self-reporting issuers may not face civil 
penalties.120  
Even though issuers are responsible for filing continuing 
disclosures, underwriters may have also violated the antifraud 
provisions.121 Underwriters face liability if they did not complete 
                                                                                                     
 113. See SCHMITT, RECENT TRENDS, supra note 20, at 13 (noting that dual 
sovereignty is one of the reasons why “the federal government has little direct 
governing or enforcement influence on municipal issuers”). 
 114. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 13 (discussing that the 
SEC’s lack of enforcement contributed to noncompliance with continuing 
disclosure requirements). 
 115. See id. at 14 (providing that Rule 15c2–12 “amounts to a voluntary 
disclosure system”). 
 116. See id. (noting the lack of direct legal consequences that issuers face). 
 117. See id. (discussing underwriters’ lack of enforcement of the continuing 
disclosure agreements). 
 118. See MCDC, supra note 20 (stating that the initiative’s purpose is 
addressing “potentially widespread violations of the federal securities laws”). 
 119. See id. (providing that the SEC Division of Enforcement will 
recommend favorable settlement terms for self-reporting issuers and 
underwriters). 
 120. See id. (noting that the Division of Enforcement “will recommend that 
the [SEC] accept a settlement in which there is no payment of any civil penalty 
by the issuer”). 
 121. See id. (discussing that the SEC may file actions against both issuers 
and underwriters). 
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adequate due diligence in determining whether issuers complied 
with their continuing disclosure obligations and failed to form a 
reasonable basis for believing the issuers’ official statements.122  
The civil penalties for self-reporting underwriters depend on 
both the offering size and the underwriters’ total revenue.123 For 
offerings of $30 million or less, underwriters face a penalty of 
$20,000 per offering containing a materially false statement.124 
Offerings of more than $30 million impose a penalty of $60,000 
per offering containing a materially false statement.125 The total 
amount of penalties for an underwriter, however, is capped.126 
Underwriters reporting total revenue over $100 million in their 
annual audited report will pay no more than $500,000.127 
Underwriters reporting total revenue between $20 million and 
$100 million in their annual audited report will pay no more than 
$250,000.128 Underwriters reporting total revenue below $20 
million in their annual audited report will pay no more than 
$100,000.129  
The theory behind the MCDC Initiative is known as the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma.130 The idea is that, if Underwriter A self-
reports, it will highlight instances where Issuer A failed to make 
continuing disclosures.131 This creates the Prisoner’s Dilemma—
                                                                                                     
 122. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C) (2014) (requiring underwriters 
to reasonably determine that issuers will provide continuing disclosures to the 
MSRB); MCDC, supra note 20 (describing how underwriters may face liability 
under the MCDC). 
 123. See MCDC, supra note 20 (discussing the civil penalties self-reporting 
underwriters may face). 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. See Paul S. Maco, Michael D. Bernard, Kristen H. Elizondo & Britt C. 
Steckman, A ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ for Issuers and Underwriters, LAW360 (May 
27, 2014, 2:51 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/538908/a-prisoner-s-
dilemma-for-issuers-and-underwriters (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (describing 
the MCDC Initiative and noting that the offer creates a Prisoner’s Dilemma) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131. Prisoner’s Dilemma, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/ 
p/prisoners-dilemma.asp (last visited Jan. 12, 2014) (discussing the definition of 
a Prisoner’s Dilemma) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  The 
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Issuer A will self-report because it believes Underwriter A will 
self-report.132 Thus, Underwriter A’s self-reporting incentivizes 
Issuer A to self-report.133 But, Underwriter A and Issuer A would 
be better off cooperating with each other so that neither 
Underwriter A nor Issuer A’s violations will come to light.134 The 
Prisoner’s Dilemma, however, reveals that they inevitably act in 
their own self-interest and are worse off than if they had 
cooperated with each other.135  
In the MCDC Initiative, both the issuer and underwriter 
would be better off not reporting any violations of Rule 15c2–12 
because they would not face the monetary penalties.136 Instead, 
the issuer and the underwriter will both self-report violations, 
fearing that the other will report violations first. While self-
reporting issuers may not face civil penalties, “[u]nderwriters 
have an incentive to over report” violations of compliance with 
continuing disclosures because of the capped amount of civil 
penalties.137 
                                                                                                     
following illustration best explains the Prisoner’s Dilemma:  
Suppose two friends, Dave and Henry, are suspected of committing a 
crime and are being interrogated in separate rooms. Both individuals 
want to minimize their jail sentence. Both of them face the same 
scenario: Dave has the option of pleading guilty or not guilty. If he 
pleads not guilty, Henry can plead not guilty and get a two-year 
sentence, or he can plead guilty and get a one-year sentence. It is in 
Henry’s best interest to plead guilty if Dave pleads not guilty. If Dave 
pleads guilty, Henry can plead not guilty and receive a five-year 
sentence. Otherwise he can plead guilty and get a three-year 
sentence. It is in Henry’s best interest to plead guilty if Dave pleads 
guilty. Dave faces the same decision matrix and follows the same 
logic as Henry. As a result, both parties plead guilty and spend three 






 135. Id. 
 136. See id. (applying the Prisoner’s Dilemma logic in an example). If you 
apply the logic of Dave and Henry from the example in the previous footnote 
and replace “guilty” with “report” and “not guilty” with “not report,” it would be 
in both the issuer’s and underwriter’s best interest to not report; however, they 
will both report violations like Dave and Henry would both plead guilty.  
 137. See MCDC, supra note 20 (providing the civil penalty amounts for 
eligible underwriters and that the Enforcement Division will recommend a 
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Because underwriters have an incentive to over-report 
violations, they may report violations that are not material.138 
These reported violations could create a precedent for future 
underwriters to report these violations, even if the violations 
should not be considered material.139 An overload of information 
could cause the important and material information to be lost 
among all of the continuing disclosures.140 Additionally, some 
issuers think that filing a continuing disclosure a few days or 
weeks after the deadline is not a failure to comply with 
continuing disclosures in any material respects, but the “[SEC] 
has provided no comfort on this point.”141 Without knowing the 
meaning of materiality in the continuing disclosure context, 
issuers and underwriters have little guidance.142  
                                                                                                     
settlement with no civil penalty for eligible issuers); GFOA Alert, supra note 25 
(warning issuers that underwriters have an incentive to over report violations); 
PFM GROUP, SEC MUNICIPAL ADVISOR RULE AND MCDC INITIATIVE 23 (2014), 
http://fsfoa.org/documents/MARule-MCDCFSFOAConference-PublicFinancial 
ManagementInc-2014-06-16_final.pdf (describing consequences if the issuer did 
not report, but the underwriter reported violations).  
 138. See GFOA Alert, supra note 25 (discussing that underwriters 
participating in the MCDC Initiative may “falsely report[] that statements made 
by issuers pertaining to their prior continuing disclosure compliance are 
material misstatements when in fact they are not” because of “erroneous 
findings of failures to file” within the faulty NRMSIR); NAT’L ASS’N OF BOND 
LAWYERS, MCDC INITIATIVE: CONSIDERATIONS FOR ANALYSIS BY ISSUERS OF 
MATERIALITY AND SELF-REPORTING 2 (2014), http://www.nabl.org/uploads/cms/ 
documents/MCDC_Initiative__Considerations_for_Analysis_by_Issuers_of_Mate
riality_and_Self-Reporting_8-5-14.pdf (“[I]ssuers and underwriters will have 
different perspectives, both regarding what may be material and what should be 
self-reported, particularly in light of the cap on liability applicable to 
underwriters and the direct application of Rule 15c2–12 only to underwriters.”); 
PFM GROUP, supra note 137 (advising that an option for the MCDC is to “report 
everything but tell SEC they are not material”).  
 139. See NFMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 25, at 37 (discussing that GFOA 
produces guidelines for continuing disclosures, but these guidelines can also be 
counterproductive in creating a perception of a disclosure ceiling that does not 
need to be exceeded).  
 140. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) 
(discussing that a fear of liability will cause management to “bury the 
shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information”); Haines, supra note 100 
(providing that it is “not necessary or desirable to disclose every bit of 
information about an issuer in an official statement; important information 
would be buried in unimportant detail”).  
 141. See POPE, supra note 50, at 62 (discussing the confusion surrounding 
continuing disclosures). 
 142. See GFOA Alert, supra note 25 (explaining that the SEC will not define 
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E. Municipal Bond Context 
Materiality plays an important role in the municipal bond 
context. First, Rule 15c2–12 requires disclosure of the occurrence 
of fourteen different events;143 seven of these events must be 
disclosed, if material.144 These events place the determination of 
materiality in the issuer’s hands.145 The other seven events are 
events that the SEC must conclude are material per se because 
the SEC requires disclosure of the events’ occurrence without the 
issuer determining if the events are material.146  
Second, the MCDC Initiative requires issuers and 
underwriters to report “materially inaccurate statements in a 
final official statement . . . prior compliance with . . . continuing 
[disclosure] obligations” that occurred within the past five 
years.147 Both issuers and underwriters must determine whether 
a material misstatement or omission occurred by referring to 
                                                                                                     
“material,” but will evaluate material violations on a case-by-case basis under 
the MCDC). 
 143. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(1)–(14) (2014) (requiring 
underwriters to agree with issuers in a continuing disclosure agreement that 
the issuers will disclose within “ten business days after the occurrence of the 
event”).  
 144. See id. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) (noting 
that the occurrence of these events must be disclosed if material within ten 
business days). These seven events are (1) non-payment related defaults; 
(2) adverse tax opinions, any material notices from the IRS about the security’s 
tax status, or any other material events affecting the security’s tax status; 
(3) modifications to bondholders’ rights; (4) bond calls; (5) release, substitution, 
or sale of property securing the bonds’ repayment; (6) merger, acquisition, sale 
of substantially all assets not in the ordinary course of business, or entry into an 
agreement to take any of these actions; and (7) appointment of a successor or 
additional trustee or change of name of trustee. Id.  
 145. See id. (requiring the disclosure upon the occurrence of these events, if 
material).  
 146. See id. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(1), (3), (4), (5), (9), (11), (12) 
(mandating that the occurrence of these events regarding the bonds issued in 
the offering must be disclosed within ten business days). 
 147. See MCDC, supra note 20 (providing that issuers and underwriters 
should self-report any instances of material violations of Rule 15c2–12 in the 
previous five years); PFM GROUP, supra note 137, at 21 (discussing the MCDC 
Initiative’s requirements). Technically, this requirement is actually in 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c2–12 and the MCDC Initiative is just enforcing it. Compare 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.15c2–12, with MCDC, supra note 20. 
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their continuing disclosures agreements.148 Then they must 
determine if they breached the agreements in any way and if any 
breaches were material.149 In essence, the MCDC Initiative 
provides a complicated two-fold materiality analysis.150 But to 
understand this analysis, we must first understand what 
“materiality” means.  
III. What Does Materiality Mean? 
When thinking about the meaning of materiality, it is 
important to remember its purpose in securities regulation: “to 
substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of 
caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business 
ethics in the securities industry.”151 As the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,152 materiality purports to filter 
out “useless information that a reasonable investor would not 
consider significant, even as part of a larger ‘mix’ of factors to 
consider in making his investment decision.”153 Over-disclosure 
could bury any pertinent information beneath unimportant 
detail.154 The delicate balance of over-disclosure and under-
disclosure finds some guidance in this common-sense approach: 
                                                                                                     
 148. See MCDC, supra note 20 (incentivizing issuers and underwriters to 
self-report any material violations of compliance with Rule 15c2–12 and 
continuing disclosure agreements) 
 149. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C) (2014) (requiring underwriters 
to reasonably determine in a written agreement or contract with issuers that 
the issuers will provide certain continuing disclosures to the MSRB). 
 150. See MCDC, supra note 20 (permitting issuers and underwriters to self-
report violations involving material inaccurate statements in bond offering 
statements); infra notes 249–251 and accompanying text (discussing the MCDC 
Initiative analysis that issuers and underwriters must undertake when deciding 
whether the participate); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), 
(8), (10), (13), (14) (requiring disclosure of these events upon occurrence, if 
material). 
 151. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). 
 152. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 153. Id. at 234 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–
49 (1976)). 
 154. See Haines, supra note 100 (explaining that it is “not necessary or 
desirable to disclose every bit of information about an issuer in an official 
statement; important information would be buried in unimportant detail”).  
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“If I were buying these bonds, what would I like to know?”155 This 
approach, however, offers only a subjective standard of what 
material information to disclose.156 Other materiality standards 
require objective measurements of materiality.157 The following 
standards provide different methods of determining 
materiality.158  
A. Securities Context 
In the securities context, TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, 
Inc.159 provides the materiality standard.160 The U.S. Supreme 
Court found that, in the context of Rule 14a–9,161 “an omitted fact 
is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to 
vote.”162 This meaning of materiality is an objective standard 
                                                                                                     
 155. See id. (providing continuing disclosure advice in a speech to the 
Michigan Municipal Finance Officers Association). 
 156. See Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonableness of the “Reasonable Woman 
Standard”: An Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment 
Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 483, 486–87 
(1992) (explaining that using an objective standard evaluates situations from a 
reasonable person’s viewpoint, while using a subjective standard evaluates 
situations from the actual person’s viewpoint). 
 157. See infra notes 162–175, 182 and accompanying text (discussing 
materiality standards that use reasonable investor and reasonable person 
viewpoints). 
 158. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a standard for 
materiality: “[a] misrepresentation is material if it would be likely to induce a 
reasonable person to manifest his assent, or if the maker knows that it would be 
likely to induce the recipient to do so.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 162 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). This standard, however, would likely not be applied 
in the municipal bond context, so it is excluded from this analysis.  
 159. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). 
 160. See id. at 449 (adopting the materiality standard for Rule 14a–9); see 
also id. at 447 n.8 (“This standard or a close approximation, has been widely 
recited in cases involving various sections of the securities laws.”).  
 161. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–9 (2014) (prohibiting proxy solicitation 
statements from containing any false or misleading statements or omissions of 
material facts). 
 162. See TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 449 (“Put another way, there must be 
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
view by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”). 
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“involving the significance of an omitted or misrepresented fact to 
a reasonable investor.”163 When discussing materiality, the Court 
noted that the standard of materiality could not be too low; 
otherwise, a corporation would “bury the shareholders in an 
avalanche of trivial information.”164 This standard, however, 
measures materiality with “a showing of a substantial likelihood 
that, under all circumstances, the omitted fact would have 
assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable 
shareholder.”165  
Rule 14a–9 prohibits using false or misleading statements 
and facts or omissions of material facts in proxy solicitation 
statements.166 Proxy solicitations occur when a corporation seeks 
authorization (the proxy) to vote on the shareholders’ behalf.167 
Municipal bond issuers, on the other hand, would never 
participate in a proxy solicitation because they do not issue stocks 
or equity.168 Additionally, bondholders possess no voting rights.169  
In Basic, Inc., the Court adopted the TSC Industries 
materiality standard for Rule 14a–9 as the materiality standard 
for Rule 10b–5.170 Like Rule 14a–9, Rule 10b–5 is an antifraud 
                                                                                                     
 163. See id. at 445 (providing that materiality is an objective standard 
despite the many variations of materiality standards). 
 164. See id. at 448–49 (discussing the policy considerations and implications 
of different materiality standards). 
 165. Id. at 449. 
 166. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–9 (2014) (prohibiting false and misleading 
statements in connection with proxy solicitations). 
 167. See Gary J. Wolfe, Robert E. Lustrin & Edward S. Horton, An 
Introduction to the Proxy Solicitation Process, SEWARD & KISSELL (June 9, 2009), 
http://www.sewkis.com/pubs/xprPubDetail.aspx?xpST=PubDetail&pub=181 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2015) (describing the purpose of proxy solicitations) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 168. See id. (discussing that “the ultimate purpose of any proxy solicitation 
is to obtain the ability to vote other shareholders' securities”).  
 169. See Bonds vs. Stocks—Which Investment is Better for You?, LEARN 
BONDS, http://learnbonds.com/bonds-vs-stocks/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2015) 
(discussing the differences in shareholders’ rights and bondholders’ rights) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 170. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 484 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (explaining that 
the Court adopted the TSC Industries materiality standard); see also 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b–5 (2014) (prohibiting the use of manipulative and deceptive devices in 
the securities market).  
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provision,171 but it has a broader scope than Rule 14a–9.172 Rule 
10b–5 prohibits any person from making any false or misleading 
statement or omitting material facts from a statement in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.173 Unlike 
many of the regulations in the Securities Act and the Exchange 
Act, this Rule applies to the municipal bond market.174 Any 
disclosure that an issuer makes must not contain any false or 
misleading statements or omit any material facts.175 
B. Efficient Market Test 
From an efficient market theory, “any act or omission which 
noticeably affects that market is material because the efficient 
market depends on the free flow of correct and complete 
information.”176 Thus, a fact or omission “is material if an 
eventual disclosure causes a notable market reaction.”177 This 
standard makes the judgment of materiality more objective by 
measuring the continuing disclosures’ effect on the market rather 
than through the reasonable investor’s viewpoint.178 
Courts have used an efficient market test in fraud-on-the-
market theory cases, which permit investors to rely on the 
integrity of a security’s market price without relying directly on a 
misleading statement in a claim for fraud.179 In an efficient 
                                                                                                     
171. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (noting that the antifraud 
provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act apply to municipal bonds). 
 172. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014) (applying to any security), with 
id. § 240.14a–9 (applying to proxy solicitation statements). 
 173. Id. § 240.10b–5. 
 174. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ii (discussing that the antifraud 
provisions of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act apply to municipal bonds). 
 175. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (preventing use of false and misleading 
statements or omissions of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale 
of any security, including municipal bonds). 
 176. See GARY P. KREIDER, ANTI-FRAUD DILEMMA: DEFINING MATERIALITY 6 
(2004), http://www.kmklaw.com/assets/attachments/AntiFraud.pdf (arguing that 
the SEC should define materiality differently between voting situations and 
market situations). 
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. at 5 (discussing the differences between the TSC Industries 
materiality standard and a market test standard). 
 179. See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Secs. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 609 (C.D. 
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market, the security’s price reflects all available material 
information.180 Thus, a security’s price “should not change 
significantly unless there is new information that is material to 
the security’s value.”181  
C. Torts Standard 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that a “matter is 
material if a reasonable man would attach importance to its 
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in 
the transaction in question.”182 
In Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co.,183 the district court used 
the torts standard of materiality in its jury instructions, and the 
Fifth Circuit upheld the jury’s conclusion that the omission of a 
promised stock option to a director from a proxy statement was 
not material.184 The omission of the stock option was not material 
because the proxy statement mentioned that the director would 
receive “some personal gain from the . . . merger[,]” and 
shareholders were “‘sufficiently alerted’ to [the director’s] 
interests ‘to be on their guard.’”185 
In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,186 the court held that a 
deficiency in the proxy statement was material under the torts 
standard.187 General Outdoor Advertising (GOA) planned to 
                                                                                                     
Cal. 2009) (noting that “[e]stablishing fraud-on-the-market requires evidence of 
market efficiency”). See generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, When Is It 
Unnecessary to Show Direct Reliance on Misrepresentation or Omission in Civil 
Securities Fraud Action Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 
U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b–5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5), 93 A.L.R. Fed. 
444 (2015) (analyzing fraud-on-the-market cases). 
 180. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988) (discussing the 
hypothesis behind fraud-on-the-market theory). 
 181. Countrywide, 273 F.R.D. at 611.  
 182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 183. 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 184. See id. at 603–04 (explaining that the torts standard of materiality “has 
a rich history of application to the securities laws”). 
 185. Id. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 403 F.2d 429, 434 (7th 
Cir. 1968)). 
 186. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). 
 187. See id. at 1302 (providing that the minority shareholders would have 
wanted to know GOA’s actual intent when the shareholders were deciding 
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merge with Gamble-Skogmo and sell some remaining advertising 
plants after the merger to realize large profits.188 The court found 
that GOA’s true intent to sell all of its remaining advertising 
plants after the merger was “a significant factor in a reasonable 
shareholder’s decision whether or not to vote for the merger.”189 
Thus, it was material.  
D. Creditworthiness Test 
Under a creditworthiness test, a fact or omission is material 
if the fact or omission substantially affects the creditworthiness 
of the municipality.190 A creditworthiness test measures the 
issuer’s financial condition and its ability to meet its debt 
obligations.191 The court in HealthSouth Corp.192 recognized that 
“material[,] new[,] unexpected information concerning the 
creditworthiness of the issuer or the prospect of default on bond 
obligations would be of interest to bondholders and affect the 
price.”193  
IV. Materiality in the Continuing Disclosure Context: Analyzing 
Materiality Standards and Tests Through the Bond Market Lens 
After discussing different materiality standards, we will now 
consider these standards in the context of the municipal bond 
market. First, this Note analyzes the policy considerations that 
                                                                                                     
whether to keep their GOA shares or exchange them for shares in Gamble-
Skogmo). 
 188. See id. at 1291 (discussing the merger’s details). 
 189. Id. at 1302.  
 190. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 67, at 12,575 
(“[C]ommentators have called for timely disclosure of events that materially 
reflect on the creditworthiness of municipal securities issuers and obligors and 
the terms of their securities.”).  
 191. See Credit Worthiness, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/credit-worthiness.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 
2015) (defining creditworthiness as “[a]n assessment of the likelihood that a 
borrower will default on [its] debt obligations”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 192. 261 F.R.D. 616 (N.D. Ala. 2009). 
 193. Id. at 635–36. 
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“materiality” in the municipal bond market should incorporate. 
Second, this Note analyzes different standards—the TSC 
Industries standard, the Efficient Market standard, the Torts 
standard, and the Creditworthiness test—through the municipal 
bond market lens. 
A. Policy Considerations 
The meaning of materiality in the municipal bond continuing 
disclosure context should incorporate the differences between 
corporate equity and debt markets and the municipal bond 
market. First, long-term prices matter more in municipal and 
corporate bond markets, whereas current prices matter more in 
the corporate equity markets because corporate equity trades 
more frequently over secondary markets than municipal and 
corporate debt.194 Consequently, a material event for a publicly 
held corporation could be a trivial event for a governmental 
entity.195 Investor confidence in a corporation and its 
management affect stock prices.196 For example, in Longman v. 
Food Lion, Inc.,197 when a PrimeTime Live episode about Food 
Lion grocery stores aired and alleged “widespread unsanitary 
practices and labor law violations,” Food Lion’s stock prices 
dropped the following day.198 An exposé on a municipal bond 
                                                                                                     
 194. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Burns, 967 F. Supp. 
2d 1143, 1149 (N.D. Ohio 2013) (noting that stocks trade more frequently than 
bonds). 
 195. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff’s expert testified that “negative 
information about a company, while affecting its stock price, may not 
significantly impact bond prices”); see also In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 
261 F.R.D. 616, 631–32 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[I]nformation that affects the price of 
stocks, such as the announcement of a dividend or earning statements, would 
not be expected to affect the price of bonds.”). 
 196. See Longman v. Food Lion, Inc., 197 F.3d 675, 680–81 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the decrease in the Food Lion stock price the day after the 
PrimeTime Live broadcast aired); PATRICK J. BROWN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
BOND MARKET 7 (2006) (explaining that stockholders have greater access to 
information and are able to determine the company’s future direction than 
bondholders).  
 197. 197 F.3d 675 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 198. See id. at 667, 680–81 (discussing that the broadcast alleged unsanitary 
practices and employees working “off-the-clock” and that stock prices fell the 
next day). 
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issuer might not have the same effect on the municipal bond’s 
price or the yield.199  
Information concerning the issuer’s creditworthiness, 
however, can affect a bond’s price. For example, HealthSouth 
Corporation, which issued corporate bonds, announced that 
Medicare payment rules changed, and the changes “would 
negatively [affect] operating income by $175 million.”200 This 
announcement caused bond prices to decrease between 5–16%.201 
Unlike stocks, the corporate bond market and the municipal bond 
market lack sensitivity to day-to-day fluctuations.202 Rather, 
general economic conditions and the treasury market affect the 
bond markets.203 Further, a municipal bond issuer’s financial 
deterioration can take longer to appear in the municipal bond 
market than a corporation’s financial deterioration in the stock 
market (or even the corporate bond market).204 As the District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas stated, “A comparison 
between equity and bond markets is a comparison between the 
proverbial apple and orange.”205 
Second, corporate equity and debt investors and municipal 
bondholders have different goals and expectations.206 
                                                                                                     
 199. See HealthSouth, 261 F.R.D. at 635 (providing that material 
information to a stockholder may not be material to a bondholder if the 
information would not affect the bond’s fixed return). 
 200. Id. at 636. 
 201. See id. (describing the experts’ event studies of HealthSouth bonds’ 
price reactions to announced information relevant to bonds). 
 202. See id. at 632 (noting that stock prices fluctuate daily). 
 203. See INST. OF CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS, THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET: 
NEW RULES, NEW OPPORTUNITIES, AND NEW STRATEGIES 7, 18–19 (1988) 
[hereinafter MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET] (providing that “when the Treasury 
market sneezes, the municipal bond market gets a cold, and vice versa” and 
economic downturns affect municipalities because local businesses, who supply 
tax revenue, suffer from the downturn as well and may not provide as much 
revenue); see also In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 
(N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[T]he price of the investment-grade bonds is not very sensitive 
to day-to-day stock price fluctuations. . . . [M]ost of the variation in the price of 
investment-grade bonds comes from the fluctuations in economy-wide interest 
rates, as opposed to firm-specific information.”).  
 204. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 10 (“Municipal bond 
credit determinants . . . usually [do not] manifest in sudden shifts that lead 
immediately to distress.”). 
 205. Newby v. Enron Corp., 529 F. Supp. 2d 644, 755 (S.D. Tex. 2006). 
 206. Compare TEMEL, supra note 34, at 133–34 (adding that bondholders’ 
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Institutional investors dominate the corporate bond market.207 In 
the municipal bond market, though, individual households, or 
retail investors, directly hold about 50% of outstanding municipal 
bonds and indirectly hold an additional 25% of bonds through 
other investment funds.208 Most retail investors are in a high-
enough tax bracket to take advantage of municipal bonds’ tax 
benefits.209 These retail investors usually hold their bonds until 
maturity.210 Bonds also trade less frequently than stocks.211 
Stockholders may sell their stocks to take advantage of capital 
gains or reduce further loss, so the current price of the stock is 
important to stockholders.212 Further, bondholders have the right 
to income through interest payments and the principal at 
maturity.213 Stockholders receive a return only by selling their 
stock or receiving a dividend, which occurs if the corporation 
                                                                                                     
investment objectives include desire for current income stream, capital 
preservation, and specific cash needs), with MARC M. GROZ, FORBES GUIDE TO 
THE MARKETS 26–27 (1999) (explaining that stockholders’ investment objectives 
include a desire for long-term capital appreciation and a belief that the potential 
return from stocks is worth the risk). 
 207. See HealthSouth Corp., 261 F.R.D. at 631 (comparing and contrasting 
the corporate equity and corporate debt markets). 
 208. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 14 (showing a pie chart with the 
breakdown of municipal security holders); GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 1 
(noting the size of the municipal bond market and that individual investors or 
households comprise half of the market owning these bonds).  
 209. See TEMEL, supra note 34, at 16 (“The principal characteristic of all 
buyers of municipal bonds is that they are in sufficiently high tax bracket that 
they can benefit from the tax exemption.”).  
 210. See MUN. SECS. RULEMAKING BD., WHAT TO EXPECT WHEN SELLING 
MUNICIPAL BONDS BEFORE MATURITY (2013), http://www.msrb.org/msrb1/EMMA/ 
pdfs/Selling-Before-Maturity.pdf (noting that most municipal bond investors are 
“buy and hold” investors); SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at v (describing the 
municipal bond market as a “buy-and-hold market”); Jason Brady, Stocks vs. 
Bonds: Why and When?, AAII J. (Sept. 2012), http://www.aaii.com/ 
journal/article/stocks-vs-bonds-why-and-when?adv=yesaai.com (last visited Jan. 
12, 2015) (providing that many investors will hold onto bonds longer to “receive 
the promised yield return”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 211. See In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 
2009) (“Investors generally view bonds as ‘buy and hold’ securities.”).  
 212. See Brady, supra note 210 (providing that “non-dividend stock returns 
are dependent on capital gains”). 
 213. See id. (describing the differences in income streams between stocks 
and bonds). 
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chooses to issue dividends.214 Thus, stockholders have unlimited 
potential return, while bondholders’ returns are limited to the 
interest they collect until the bond matures. 
The age differences between municipal bondholders and 
stockholders may also influence their expectations and goals.215 
Investors with the majority of their holdings in stocks tend to be 
younger and have an appetite for risk.216 Municipal bondholders, 
however, are usually older, closer to retirement, or at retirement 
and tend to allocate the majority of their investments in fixed 
income or bonds.217 Additionally, bondholders are concerned with 
an issuer’s stability because stability is the investors’ assurance 
in receiving interest payments and principal.218 Most 
stockholders, while also concerned with a company’s stability, 
care more about the company’s profit maximization.219  
Third, corporate equity and debt investors and most 
municipal bondholders do not have the same capacity to process 
the information they gain from disclosures.220 While institutional 
                                                                                                     
 214. See id. (discussing that dividend-paying stocks possess income 
uncertainty). 
 215. See LYDON, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that age is an important factor 
when looking at a bondholder). 
 216. See Bonds Basics 1, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
university/bonds/bonds2.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2015) (noting that younger 
investors typically place the majority of their wealth in stocks) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 217. See LYDON, supra note 29, at 4 (discussing that retirement aged 
investors want to preserve their savings and invest in more bonds than stocks); 
INVESTOPEDIA, supra note 216 (discussing that investors closer to retirement or 
at retirement place their investments in fixed income). 
 218. See Bond Basics 2, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
university/bonds/bonds2.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2015) (“[T]he issuer’s stability 
is your main assurance of getting paid back.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 219. See BROWN, supra note 196, at xi (“People like to think they are able to 
assess the prospects of a company, presumably better than the market, and in 
the process make a fortune.”); see also Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 681–82 
(Mich. 1919) (describing how Ford stockholders sued the corporation when 
Henry Ford decided to reinvest profits in the company rather than distribute 
special dividends to stockholders and noting that stockholders expect to receive 
profit from their investment through dividend distributions).  
 220. See GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 2 (expressing concern about 
whether retail investors in bonds have enough information about issuers); see 
also id. at 11 (noting that receiving annual information is insufficient to monitor 
an issuer’s financial condition); MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET, supra note 203, at 10 
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investors in municipal bonds possess greater access to 
information about bond prices and market volume, retail 
investors do not enjoy this same access.221 Many retail investors 
rely on their financial advisor or broker for information.222 
Corporate equity and bond investors, like institutional investors 
in municipal bonds, have greater access to market prices and 
trading volume due to greater market transparency.223 
Fourth, the stock market experiences greater volatility in the 
short run than the bond market.224 Thus, a bondholder is “less 
likely to suffer large losses in a short period” than a 
stockholder.225 While an investment in stocks produces higher 
returns in the long run, an investment in bonds provides capital 
preservation and lower overall risk.226 Consequently, stocks have 
                                                                                                     
(discussing that even radical differences exist between the municipal bond 
market and the corporate bond market for availability, timeliness, and 
comparability of credit information); BROWN, supra note 196, at xi (noting most 
national newspapers publish daily closing prices of leading stocks, but the 
majority of outstanding bond prices are not published).   
 221. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 67, at 12,756 (explaining that 
investors buy bonds relying upon outdated and incomplete information); Chris 
Downing & Frank Zhang, Trading Activity and Price Volatility in the Municipal 
Bond Market, J. FIN. 899, 900 (2004) (“Large institutional investors are likely to 
be much better informed about price and market volume than are individual 
investors . . . .”); Haines, supra note 100 (noting that investors complain about 
issuers releasing information “too little, too late”). 
 222. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1029–30 (“With limited access to 
disclosure, a typical investor would be more likely to rely on word of mouth, the 
credit rating on the bond, and whether the bond enjoyed the protection of bond 
insurance.”).  
 223. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 2 (discussing that municipal bond 
investors have less access to information than investors in other U.S. capital 
markets); MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET, supra note 220, at 10 (describing the 
radical differences between the corporate bond market and the municipal bond 
market in terms of availability, timeliness, and comparability of credit 
information). 
 224. See Brady, supra note 210 (contrasting the market volatility between 
stocks and bonds).  
 225. See Thomas Kenny, Why Invest in Bonds, ABOUT MONEY, 
http://bonds.about.com/od/bonds101/a/Why-Invest-In-Bonds.htm (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2014) (noting that having a diversified portfolio with fixed income, 
including bonds, decreases potential loss because stocks may experience high 
volatility) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 226. See BROWN, supra note 196, at xi (“Bonds are intrinsically safer 
investments than equities.”). 
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unlimited upside, while bonds do not.227 Additionally, the price 
movement differs for stocks and bonds.228 Further, between 
corporate bonds and municipal bonds, municipal bonds 
experience less volatility than corporate bonds, and corporate 
bonds are riskier investments.229 
Fifth, the corporate bond market and the municipal bond 
market are distinct and separate. Generally, corporations issue 
corporate bonds possessing two different credit risks: investment-
grade bonds and high-yield (or junk) bonds.230 While investment-
grade bonds are more analogous to municipal bonds because they 
have higher credit ratings than junk bonds, corporate bonds 
involve more credit risk and have higher rates of default.231 
Further, junk bonds have a higher correlation to movements in 
the stock market than the bond market.232 Particularly during 
recessions, junk bonds’ values fall because of the increase in 
default rates on these obligations.233 Even though corporate 
                                                                                                     
 227. See Brady, supra note 212 (noting the volatility and return differences 
between the stock market and the bond market). 
 228. See Michael J. Fleming & Eli M. Remdona, What Moves the Bond 
Market?, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV., Dec. 1997, at 31, 32 (“[S]tock 
prices depend on both cash flows and the discount rate, while bond prices—for 
which cash flows are fixed in nominal terms—depend only on the discount 
rate.”).  
 229. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (providing that municipal bonds 
have lower default rates than corporate bonds); Kenneth Daniels, Demissew 
Diro Ejara & Jayaraman Vijayakumar, Debt Maturity, Credit Risk, and 
Information Asymmetry: The Case of Municipal Bonds, 45 FIN. REV. 603, 604 
(2010) [hereinafter The Case of Municipal Bonds] (discussing that 
underinvestment and excessive risk taking happen more in the corporate sector 
than the municipal bond sector). 
 230. See JEFFREY J. HAAS, CORPORATE FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL 215–16 (2004) 
(describing corporate bond credit ratings); Types of Bonds, LEARN BONDS, 
http://learnbonds.com/types-of-bonds/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (outlining the 
four major types of bonds and generally describing each type) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 231. See David Waring, Corporate Bonds, LEARN BONDS (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://learnbonds.com/corporate-bonds/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (explaining 
general characteristics of corporate bonds) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 232. See David Waring, Junk Bonds, LEARN BONDS (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://learnbonds.com/junk-bonds/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2015) (discussing junk 
bonds’ performance) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 233. See id. (discussing junk bonds); see also HAAS, supra note 230, at 217–
18 (describing junk bonds and their credit risk). 
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bonds involve more risk than municipal bonds, corporations are 
subject to greater securities regulation than municipal bond 
issuers.234 Thus, a different materiality standard for the 
municipal bond market should compensate for the lack of 
regulation in the municipal bond market.  
Last, the nature of the issuer of corporate equity and debt 
and of municipal bonds differs. Corporate issuers are profit 
driven and face higher risks of company failure.235 Because 
corporations compete with each other to survive, they may face 
bankruptcy, experience liquidation, or change ownership.236 As a 
result, the SEC requires greater financial disclosure from 
corporations—making them more transparent to the investing 
public—than it does (even indirectly) from municipalities.237 
Because municipalities do not engage in direct competition for 
survival, they are not profit driven in the same way that 
companies are; as a result, they are more stable and secure as 
vectors for investment.238 Municipal bond default rarely occurs.239 
Even in the case of bankruptcy, municipalities are semi-
                                                                                                     
 234. See supra notes 46–64 and accompanying text (explaining that 
municipal bonds, unlike other U.S. capital markets, are largely exempt from 
regulation under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act). 
 235. See TEMEL, supra note 206, at 51 (discussing that “[m]ost state and 
local governments do not have the same profit motive” as corporations and issue 
bonds for public purposes); Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) 
(determining that corporate purpose is profit maximization); see also SEC 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (providing that municipal bonds have lower default 
rates than corporate bonds). But see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate 
Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 13–14 (2015) (arguing that corporate 
law does not require profit maximization and that corporations instead can 
pursue a wide variety of interests, including religious interests). 
 236. See The Case of Municipal Bonds, supra note 229, at 604 (“Corporations 
could face liquidity problems when [a corporate bond] matures, hence they face 
suboptimal liquidation.”). 
 237. See Downing & Zhang, supra note 221, at 900 (noting that publicly held 
corporations must provide quarterly financial information while municipal bond 
issuers only provide annual financial information). 
 238. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (providing that municipal bonds 
have historically lower default rates than corporate and foreign bonds). 
 239. See id. at 24–25 (discussing that, although municipal defaults are rare, 
they do happen and highlighting many recent high-profile bankruptcies); see 
also GAO REPORT, supra note 99, at 19 (noting that between 1991 and 1997, 177 
municipalities filed for bankruptcy, while 49,000 businesses filed for bankruptcy 
between March 2008 and March 2009). 
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sovereign, meaning “they do not undergo liquidation or any 
change in ownership.”240 
The primary purposes of regulating securities are protecting 
investors and stimulating efficient markets.241 As a result, the 
materiality standard in the municipal bond context should 
incorporate retail investors’ concerns: issuer creditworthiness, 
capital preservation, tax advantages, and meeting specific cash 
needs. Capital preservation and meeting specific cash needs 
depend upon one thing: Whether the issuer will meet its 
obligations.242 Thus, the ultimate concern remains whether the 
investor will be repaid.243 While the determinants of whether a 
municipal issuer can make payments depend on the type of bond 
issued, some determinants are as follows: (1) the municipality’s 
future growth potential; (2) the current tax base; and, if the bonds 
are insured, (3) the bond insurer’s ability to cover any shortfall 
related to an issuer’s default (as measured by its credit rating).244  
As the following applications show, the creditworthiness test 
most effectively encompasses these needs. As discussed in Part 
III.E, a fact would be material under this test if it substantially 
affects the creditworthiness of the municipality or the 
municipality’s ability to make its debt service payments.245 While 
this standard differs from the TSC Industries standard, the 
                                                                                                     
 240. The Case of Municipal Bonds, supra note 229, at 604.  
 241. See supra notes 194–240 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences between the municipal bond market and corporate equity and debt 
markets). 
 242. See The Basics of Municipal Bonds, INVESTOPEDIA, 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/bonds/05/022805.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 
2015) (discussing that if an issuer becomes unable to meet its financial 
obligations, then it may not be able to make interest payments or repayment of 
the principal) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 243. See CITIBANK, MUNICIPAL SECURITIES: AN INVESTOR’S GUIDE 4, 11 (2012), 
https://online.citibank.com/JRS/popups/Municipal_Securities_Brochure.pdf 
(explaining that repayment priority and the issuer’s credit risk are important 
factors to consider when purchasing municipal bonds); LYDON, supra note 29, at 
5 (“Credit quality is one of the main criteria when it comes to judging the 
investment quality of a bond.”). 
 244. See TEMEL, supra note 34, at 172, 178, 191–92 (discussing credit 
determinants affecting an issuer’s ability to meet its obligations). 
 245. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 67, at 12,575 
(“[C]ommentators have called for timely disclosure of events that materially 
reflect on the creditworthiness of municipal securities issuers and obligors and 
the terms of their securities.”). 
2024 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1989 (2015) 
municipal bond market and the corporate equity and debt 
markets have clear distinctions.246  
B. TSC Industries Standard 
Under the TSC Industries standard, a continuing disclosure 
or omission of a continuing disclosure meets the materiality 
threshold if the information would significantly alter a 
reasonable bondholder’s total mix of information.247 In Rule 15c2–
12, if issuers were to replace “if material” with “if it would 
significantly alter a reasonable bondholder’s total mix of 
information,” then the issuers would have to evaluate whether 
any occurrences of the following events meet this materiality 
standard: nonpayment related defaults; material notices and 
determinations about tax status or material events affecting tax 
status of the bond; modifications to rights of security holders; 
bond calls; release, substitution, or sale of property securing the 
repayment of the bonds; mergers and acquisitions; and 
appointment of a successor or change in trustee.248  
This standard presents problems for the MCDC Initiative. 
Issuers and underwriters deciding whether to participate in the 
initiative must look back over the past five years and determine 
whether any occurrence of those events that was not disclosed in 
a continuing disclosure significantly altered a reasonable 
investor’s total mix of available information.249 For speculative 
events, analyzing whether a reasonable investor would have 
considered the omission significant at the time presents 
                                                                                                     
 246. C.f. Thomas Kenny, The Difference Between Stocks and Bonds, ABOUT 
MONEY, http://www.bonds.about.com/od/bonds101/a/The-Difference-Between-
Stocks-And-Bonds.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2015) (analyzing differences between 
stocks and bonds) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 247. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976) 
(describing the materiality standard). 
 248. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) 
(2014) (providing that the occurrence of these events must be disclosed, if 
material); TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448–49 (discussing the materiality 
standard applied to Rule 14a–9).  
 249. See TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 448–49 (describing the materiality 
standard); MCDC, supra note 20 (providing that issuers and underwriters may 
self-report all material violations of noncompliance with continuing disclosures 
within the past five years). 
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difficulty.250 Issuers must also consider how significant the 
reasonable investor would find the occurrence of one of these 
events.251 
The TSC Industries materiality standard also poses several 
problems in the context of municipal bond disclosures, namely 
the distinctions between the stock market and the bond 
market.252 First, the materiality standard revolves around 
stockholders, who possess voting rights.253 Analyzing materiality 
from a voting standpoint must be based on subjective analysis of 
factors affecting voting decisions.254 Bondholders, however, do not 
have voting rights.255 Instead, they possess contract rights.256 As 
such, they have no voice in an issuer’s future direction of a 
municipality.257  
Second, the factors affecting an issuer’s creditworthiness 
“usually [do not] manifest in sudden shifts that lead immediately 
to distress.”258 A fact or event rising to the threshold of 
materiality could be a tipping point.259 Put another way, the 
occurrence of an event in Rule 15c2–12 may indicate the issuer’s 
financial condition but does not significantly alter a reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 250. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (“Where[] the 
event is contingent or speculative in nature, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
the ‘reasonable investor’ would have considered the omitted information 
significant at the time.”).  
 251. See id. at 240 (“Materiality depends on the significance the reasonable 
investor would place on the withheld or misrepresented information.”).  
 252. See supra notes 194–240 and accompanying text (discussing the 
differences between the stock market and the bond market). 
 253. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1032 (noting that stockholders engage in 
activism as a method of corporate accountability but that bondholders are at a 
marked disadvantage in comparison).  
 254. See KREIDER, supra note 176, at 5 (discussing the differences in 
viewpoints from a voting perspective and a market perspective).  
 255. See LEARN BONDS, supra note 169 (explaining the differences between 
bondholders’ rights and stockholders’ rights). 
 256. See David M.W. Harvey, Bondholders’ Rights and the Case for a 
Fiduciary Duty, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1023, 1036 (2012) (discussing that 
bondholders often rely on the bond contract for legal remedies). 
 257. See Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1032 (providing that bondholders do not 
have the same opportunities as stockholders to hold issuers accountable).  
 258. SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 10. 
 259. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN 
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE 7–9 (2000) (describing that a tipping point is a moment 
“when everything can change all at one” and “little causes can have big effects”). 
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investor’s total mix of information.260 Several months or years 
later, however, when other events occur, it could cause 
subsequent facts and events to be material. Those subsequent 
facts and events would then be the tipping point to significantly 
alter the total mix of information.261 
Third, the “reasonable investor” standard may not provide 
the best method of investor protection. The conceptualized 
“reasonable investor” includes several investor profiles: the 
rational investor,262 the speculative investor,263 and the 
sophisticated investor.264 Yet, these profiles suggest a lack of 
protection for a less sophisticated investor—an investor who lacks 
strong financial literacy.265 In fact, Professor Joan Heminway 
argued the reasonable investor is a female investor because 
female investors seek investment advice more often than their 
male counterparts, are more risk averse, and trade less often.266 
Proponents of the TSC Industries materiality standard argue 
that the additional fact or event acting as the tipping point 
reveals the pertinent information an investor would consider and, 
therefore, should be disclosed.267 At this point, disclosure could be 
too late before an issuer’s financial deterioration and not provide 
                                                                                                     
 260. See TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(discussing that a fact rises to the threshold of material if it “significantly 
alter[s] the ‘total mix’ for information made available”). 
 261. See id. at 448–49 (describing the need for a materiality standard that 
balances overdisclosure and underdisclosure); GLADWELL, supra note 259, at 7–9 
(“[T]he idea that epidemics can rise or fall in one dramatic moment—is the most 
important[] . . . . The name given to that one dramatic moment in an epidemic 
when everything can change all at once is the Tipping Point.”). 
 262. See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Female Investors and Securities Fraud: 
Is the Reasonable Investor a Woman?, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 296–
98 (2009) (describing the reasonable investor as the rational investor). 
 263. See id. at 298–301 (explaining that the reasonable investor may include 
the speculative investor). 
 264. See id. at 301–06 (describing the reasonable investor as the 
sophisticated investor). 
 265. See id. at 306–09 (discussing that the courts, when describing the 
reasonable investor, exclude the less sophisticated investor, the moody investor, 
and the moral investor). 
 266. See id. at 319–22 (arguing that female investors conform closer to the 
reasonable investor than male investors). 
 267. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(explaining that a material omission would have “assumed actual significance in 
the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder”). 
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enough information in a timely manner to bondholders. Issuers 
that provide timely and regularly filed disclosures will provide 
adequate notice to investors of their deteriorating financial 
stability.268  
Despite these problems with the TSC Industries materiality 
standard, the SEC will likely apply this standard in the 
municipal bond context. First, it is the classic definition of 
materiality.269 Second, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted this test 
for Rule 10b–5 in Basic Inc., so it seems likely that the Court 
would adopt it for other SEC rules.270 Third, when speaking to 
the Michigan Municipal Finance Officers Association in 2000, 
SEC attorney Martha Haines cited the TSC Industries 
materiality standard when discussing continuing disclosures in 
the bond market.271 Further, she noted that the concepts of 
materiality, accuracy, and completeness found in Rule 10b–5 
apply to municipal bonds.272 Finally, in the corporate bond 
market context, courts have applied this materiality standard.273 
Notwithstanding these reasons the SEC may rely on to apply the 
TSC Industries standard, this standard possesses many flaws for 
application in the municipal bond market.274 
                                                                                                     
 268. See SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 11 (discussing that 
regular filing of continuing disclosures provides investors with warning of 
issuers’ financial deterioration).  
 269. See KREIDER, supra note 176, at 6 (noting that, even though TSC 
Industries, Inc. was in the context of Rule 14a–9, the Court’s definition of 
materiality remains the classic definition and that Sarbanes–Oxley Act also 
used this standard for professional conduct rules). 
 270. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting the TSC 
Industries materiality standard for Rule 10b–5). 
 271. See Haines, supra note 100 (“A fact is ‘material’ if there is a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by 
reasonable investors as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of 
information made available.”). 
 272. See id. (advising that the materiality standards from Rule 10b–5 apply 
to municipal bonds).  
 273. See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1228, 1242–43 (D. Del. 1978) 
(concluding that an omission was not material where bondholders claimed that 
a tender offer omitted material facts).  
 274. See supra notes 249–266 and accompanying text (explaining the TSC 
Industries materiality standard in the municipal bond market context). 
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C. Efficient Market Test 
Applying the Efficient Market Test, a fact or event meets the 
materiality threshold if it causes a change in the municipal bond 
market.275 In Rule 15c2–12, issuers must file a continuing 
disclosure if the occurrence of the events with the qualifier “if 
material” causes a change in the bond market.276  
This materiality standard functions better for equity 
markets. The standard requires issuers to analyze whether the 
occurrence of an event caused the bond’s price or interest rate to 
change in the market.277 Bond market fluctuations usually occur 
due to other market factors, such as a rise in interest rates or 
movements in the Treasury market.278 Issuers would have to 
speculate whether a change in the market resulted from a larger, 
macroeconomic cause or from the occurrence of one of the 
events.279 Because noncompliance with continuing disclosures is 
already widespread, requiring issuers to make these kinds of 
speculations might worsen compliance.280 In hindsight, experts 
use event studies to determine the effect of material information 
on a security’s market price.281 Rule 15c2–12, however, requires 
                                                                                                     
 275. See KREIDER, supra note 176, at 5–6 (arguing that materiality should be 
analyzed by measuring a disclosure’s effect on the market).  
 276. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) (2014) 
(requiring that occurrence of these events must be disclosed within ten business 
days, if material); KREIDER, supra note 176, at 5–6 (discussing that the efficient 
market materiality test measures a disclosure’s effect on the market). 
 277. See KREIDER, supra note 176, at 6 (noting that “any act or omission 
which noticeably affects that market is material because the efficient market 
depends on the free flow of correct and complete information”). 
 278. See INST. OF CHARTERED FIN. ANALYSTS, supra note 203, at 18 
(discussing that general economic conditions affect municipalities). 
 279. Cf. In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Secs. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 611 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (“[E]fficiency is  somewhat harder to establish for non-exchange 
markets . . . where trades are less centralized.”); id. at 615 (“Debt and equity 
respond differently to some types of news. Debt reacts to the risk of a change in 
interest rates . . . . Until the financial situation becomes severe enough that the 
issuer is likely to default, there is relatively little effect on debt price.”).  
 280. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 63 (noting that some panelists at the 
SEC field hearings urged the SEC not to impose more disclosures or 
standardized disclosures because small issuers may not have the resources and 
the municipal bond market is not a one size fits all market). 
 281. See Countrywide, 273 F.R.D. at 614 (describing the use of event studies 
to test for a causal connection between disclosure of information and price 
movement). 
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disclosure of the occurrence of an event within ten business 
days.282 The market may not immediately incorporate the 
occurrence of the event.283  
In reality, the markets are not as efficient as the economic 
models assume, so determining price changes from omitted 
disclosures can be speculative and difficult.284 The lack of efficient 
market occurs because municipal bonds are not highly traded; 
thus, new information does not affect the price of municipal 
bonds as quickly as the price of equities. Additionally, applying 
this standard in court would likely result in a “battle of the 
experts.”285 The expert for the issuer would likely say that the 
omission of the event would not have affected the market, while 
the expert for the government would say that it would have 
affected the market.286 Like the TSC Industries standard, the 
efficient market test is not the most optimal test for the 
municipal bond market.  
D. Torts Standard 
Applying the torts materiality standard to the continuing 
disclosure context, the occurrence of the events with the qualifier 
“if material” meets the materiality threshold “if a reasonable man 
would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in 
determining his choice of action.”287 Like the TSC Industries 
                                                                                                     
 282. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C) (2014) (providing the list of 
events). 
 283. See Countrywide, 273 F.R.D. at 612 (noting that “even an efficient 
market may not impound all material information immediately”). 
 284. See BALLARD SPAHR, supra note 94 (discussing that the market effect of 
a disclosure or omission reliably measures a bond’s price effect when the market 
is efficient and noting that “[t]he SEC has reported that the [municipal bond] 
market exhibits features inconsistent with efficiency”).  
 285. See In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Secs. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 586, 610 (C.D. 
Cal. 2009) (explaining that the defendants’ experts and the plaintiffs’ experts 
disagreed about “the degree of efficiency that is demonstrated by the record”). 
 286. See id. at 615–23 (discussing the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinions and 
studies vis-à-vis the defendants’ experts’ opinions and studies regarding the 
efficiency of the securities’ markets at issue). 
 287. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) 
(2014) (requiring that occurrence of these events, if material, must be disclosed 
within ten business days); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979) (explaining the materiality standard in the torts context). 
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standard, issuers would analyze an occurring event’s 
importance.288 Thus, an issuer must analyze whether the 
occurrence of any event in Rule 15c2–12 would cause a 
reasonable man to attach importance to its occurrence in 
determining his choice of action.289  
This definition of materiality poses several problems for the 
municipal bond context. First, this definition lowers and broadens 
the materiality threshold.290 If the materiality standard is too low 
and broad, then issuers over-disclose, burying important 
information in “an avalanche of trivial information.”291 This 
reasoning led the TSC Industries Court to reject this test and 
adopt the TSC Industries materiality standard.292 Likewise, it 
seems improbable that the SEC or a court would apply the torts 
materiality standard in the context of Rule 15c2–12.  
Second, this standard is not tailored to the securities market 
or the bond market because it uses a “reasonable man” standard 
rather than a “reasonable investor” standard.293 Perhaps this 
slight distinction appears trivial, but a materiality standard 
should be based on a reasonable investor, not a reasonable man, 
which is used primarily in torts negligence claims.294 While the 
                                                                                                     
 288. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (explaining that 
materiality depends on whether the “reasonable man would attach importance” 
to the matter), with TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) 
(discussing that the material standard is whether the reasonable investor would 
consider it to “significantly alter[] the ‘total mix’ of information made 
available”). 
 289. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) 
(requiring that occurrence of these events must be disclosed within ten business 
days, if material); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (discussing the 
materiality standard in the torts context). 
 290. See TSC Indus., Inc., 426 U.S. at 445 (discussing that the court of 
appeals applied the tort standard of materiality, but other courts rejected this 
standard because of the low threshold for liability). 
 291. See id. at 448–49 (analyzing the problems with the conventional tort 
materiality standard).  
 292. See id. (rejecting the application of the torts materiality standard for 
Rule 14a–9). 
 293. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) 
(determining materiality from the perspective of the “reasonable man”). 
 294. See Michael J. Duffy, Testing Good Securities Disclosure: Tales of the 
Reasonable Investor, 38 MONASH UNIV. L. REV. 25, 26 (2012) (describing that the 
reasonable investor is a more specialized version of the reasonable man); James 
O. Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 BUS. LAW. 887, 
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“reasonable man” possesses the perspective of the ordinarily 
prudent man, the “reasonable investor” possesses an 
understanding and sophistication of the securities markets.295  
Overall, the torts materiality standard lowers the materiality 
threshold too much and fails to evaluate this threshold from the 
reasonable investor’s perspective. As the standard is not applied 
in the context of Rule 14a–9 or Rule 10b–5, the standard should 
not be applied in the context of Rule 15c2–12.  
E. Creditworthiness Test 
Applying a creditworthiness test to the meaning of 
materiality in Rule 15c2–12 would mean that an event is 
material if it substantially affects the issuer’s creditworthiness or 
ability to make its debt service payments.296 Thus, an issuer must 
file a continuing disclosure if the occurrence of the events with 
the qualifier “if material” substantially affects the issuer’s 
creditworthiness or its ability to make debt service payments.297  
                                                                                                     
895 (1977) (“Not all men are investors so it would seem that a test focusing on 
the ‘reasonable man’ would not reflect those added attributes, such as degree of 
knowledge about the markets, that a ‘reasonable investor’ would possess.”); see 
also In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967 n.16 (1996) (explaining why 
negligence allegations of a corporation’s board of directors should not be 
evaluated from a “reasonable man” standard and providing that “[i]t is doubtful 
we want business men and women to be encouraged to make decisions as 
hypothetical person of ordinary judgment and prudence might”).  
 295. See Josephine Coffey, The Reasonable Investor Test Across Two 
Continents, 1 J. AUSTRALASIAN L. TEACHERS ASS’N 45, 45 (2008) (comparing the 
reasonable investor test between Australia and Ireland); Heminway, supra note 
262, at 301 (explaining that the courts expect the reasonable investor to 
“understand, for example, the time-value of money, diversification and risk, and 
the securities industry’s compensation structure”). 
 296. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 67, at 12,757 (noting that 
commenters requested that issuers make continuing disclosures for events that 
reflect upon the issuers’ creditworthiness).  
 297. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14) 
(requiring that occurrence of these events must be disclosed within ten business 
days, if material); see also In re HealthSouth Corp. Secs. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 
635–36 (N.D. Ala. 2009) (“[M]aterial unexpected information concerning the 
creditworthiness of the issuer or the prospect of default on bond obligations 
would be of interest to bondholders . . . .”); SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 
67, at 12,757 (noting that commenters requested application of a 
creditworthiness test for continuing disclosures). 
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This test places the materiality threshold as the municipal 
bondholders’ primary concern—whether the issuer will be able to 
meet its obligations.298 Issuers, who have full access to 
information about their financial condition, can better evaluate 
whether the occurrence of any event in Rule 15c2–12 
substantially affects their creditworthiness or default risk.299 
They do not have to make judgment calls about whether the 
occurring event will significantly affect the reasonable investor’s 
total mix of information.300 Using this standard could improve 
issuers’ compliance with the continuing disclosure requirements. 
Greater compliance improves investors’ access to information in 
the market, improving market efficiency.301  
The standard also requires disclosure if the occurring event 
substantially affects the issuer’s creditworthiness.302 Disclosure 
of all events related to whether issuers will be able to service debt 
payments protects investors because it gives them timely notice 
of financial deterioration.303 
                                                                                                     
 298. See supra notes 206–219, 243–244 and accompanying text (discussing 
bondholders’ primary concern when investing in municipal bonds). 
 299. See Peter Borkin, SEC’s Message: Bond Issuers Must Provide Full, 
Accurate and Timely Information About Their Financial Condition or Face 
Prosecution, HAGENS BERMAN (Nov. 2013), http://www.hb-securities.com/news/ 
newsletters/Issue%205/sec-s-message-bond-issuers-must-provide-full-accurate-
and-timely-information-about-their-financial-condition-or-face-prosecution (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015) (quoting Rosalind Tyson, an SEC director of the Los 
Angeles Regional Office, “Municipal officials have a personal obligation to 
ensure that investors are provided with complete and accurate information 
about the issuer’s financial condition”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 300. See supra text accompanying notes 249–266 (discussing the problems 
with the TSC Industries materiality standard). 
 301. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at ix (providing that transparency is 
vital to promoting competition); SCHMITT, CONSEQUENCES, supra note 83, at 11 
(noting that if regular continuing disclosures show that the creditworthiness of 
a bond was deteriorating, an investor would not likely buy bonds at par or 
premium prices, so greater information leads to a more efficient market); 
Hamilton, supra note 3, at 1020 (discussing that the advice is only as good as 
the quality of available information). 
 302. Cf. Credit Worthiness, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/c/credit-worthiness.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2015) (defining 
creditworthiness as “[a]n assessment of the likelihood that a borrower will 
default on their debt obligations”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 303. See id. (discussing the meaning of creditworthiness); see also POPE, 
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Finally, this standard, to some extent, absorbs other 
materiality standards. The reasonable investor would consider 
new information important (tort standard) in relation to the total 
mix of information available (TSC Industries standard) if it 
reflects the issuer’s ability to pay.304 So, this test cuts more 
directly to the point, while also incorporating some benefits from 
the other materiality standards. Thus, the creditworthiness test 
provides the optimal materiality standard for the municipal bond 
market and Rule 15c2–12.  
V. Application of a Creditworthiness Test in Rule 15c2–12 
Of the materiality tests discussed in Part IV, the SEC should 
adopt the creditworthiness test to determine materiality in Rule 
15c2–12. The following examples compare the application of the 
creditworthiness test with the TSC Industries materiality 
standard.305  
In Scenario 1, a city issues tax-increment revenue bonds306 to 
improve the municipality’s urban residential area.307 The project 
increases property values, which increases the property tax 
revenue flowing from the parcels near the improvements.308 This 
incremental increase in property tax revenue collections provides 
the revenue stream for the bonds.309 Suppose the issuer agreed to 
                                                                                                     
supra note 50, at 81 (explaining that disclosures provide to investors the risks 
associated with the particular bond). 
304. See supra notes 160–165, 182 and accompanying test (explaining the 
TSC Industries materiality standard and the torts materiality standard).  
 305. See supra notes 269–273 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reasons why courts will likely apply the TSC Industries standard). 
 306. See Alexander D. Flachsbart, Note, Municipal Bonds in Bankruptcy 
§ 902(2) and the Proper Scope of “Special Revenues” in Chapter 9, 72 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 955, 1012 (2015) (explaining that this type of financing is actually 
called tax-increment financing).  
 307. See Urban Renewal Areas, WESTMINSTER COLORADO, http://www.ci. 
westminster.co.us/CityGovernment/CommunityDevelopment/UrbanRenewalAre
as.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (describing Westminster’s urban renewal 
areas and the revenue bonds issued to provide the funding) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 308. See id. (explaining that the redeveloped area with a shopping center 
and grocery store in South Westminster improved property values). 
 309. See id. (noting that increased property tax revenue from the 
redevelopment of Holly Park will generate the repayment of the bonds).  
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use the proceeds of the bond issue to plant trees in the improved 
area. Instead, due to structural and spatial concerns, the issuer 
used the proceeds to build additional sidewalks. Failing to plant 
the trees would be a nonpayment related default.310 An issuer 
must disclose its occurrence within ten business days, if 
material.311 Failing to plant the trees likely would not 
substantially affect an issuer’s creditworthiness because the 
property tax revenue continues to provide the funding for the 
revenue bond obligations.312 Likewise, applying the TSC 
Industries standard, failing to plant the trees likely would not 
significantly alter a reasonable investor’s total mix of 
information. Thus, in some circumstances, the determination of 
whether an event is material applying either the 
creditworthiness test or the TSC Industries standard will be the 
same. 
As a contrasting example,313 suppose a municipality finances 
the purchase of a new city hall by marketing lease obligations 
through a third-party lessor.314 The third-party lessor buys the 
property and leases it to the municipality.315 Then the third-party 
lessor assigns the lease to a trustee, who sells fractional interests 
in the lease—called “certificates of participation” (COPs)—to 
investors.316 Thus, the municipality makes lease payments, which 
                                                                                                     
 310. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(5)(i)(C)(2) (2014) (providing that one of 
the continuing disclosures is the occurrence of a non-payment related default, if 
material). 
 311. Id. 
312.  This scenario assumes that the lack of trees does not mean that 
property values will not increase, which would jeopardize bondholder 
repayment. 
313.  In scenario 1, the increase in property tax collections caused by the 
increase in property values provides the revenue stream for the bonds. In 
scenario 2, certificates of participation function like general obligation bonds. 
Repayment of the certificates of participation can come from any available 
municipal revenue. Thus, in scenario 1, bondholders are concerned about the 
issuer’s creditworthiness related to the increase in property taxes, while in 
scenario 2, bondholders are concerned about the issuer’s overall 
creditworthiness. 
 314. See CAL. DEBT ADVISORY COMM’N, GUIDELINES FOR LEASES AND 
CERTIFICATES OF PARTICIPATION 4 (1993), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ 
cdiac/reports/Guidelines93-8.pdf (explaining certificate of participation lease 
structures). 
 315. See id. (describing the typical certificate of participation offering). 
 316. See id. (“[A] COP entitles its owner to a proportionate share of 
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the trustee splits up proportionally and distributes to the COP 
holders.317 Then, suppose the municipality leases part of the city 
hall building to a small business, which has a history of missing 
lease payments.  
Under Rule 15c2–12, this event could be considered a 
“substitution . . . of property securing repayment of the 
securities.”318 Under a continuing disclosure agreement, the 
issuer would have to disclose the occurrence of this event within 
ten business days, if material.319 Applying the creditworthiness 
test for materiality, the issuer would likely not have to report the 
occurrence of this event.320 Because the creditworthiness test 
focuses on the sources of revenue available for repayment, it would 
recognize that COPs are secured by all available municipal 
revenues, not just those derived from leasing portions of city hall. 
Assuming the city otherwise is in solid financial shape, the mere 
occurrence of leasing part of city hall to a small business does not 
substantially affect the issuer’s creditworthiness or ability to 
meet its obligations.  
Alternatively, under the TSC Industries standard, the 
occurrence of this event would likely significantly alter the 
reasonable investor’s total mix of information.321 Because the 
TSC Industries standard considers all information about an 
issuer, including how it manages certain elements of its property, 
it could easily place too much emphasis on an event that, though 
relatively minor, directly affects the collateral securing the 
COPs.322 
Applying the creditworthiness test and the TSC Industries 
standard reaches the same conclusion regarding materiality in 
                                                                                                     
lease . . . payments made by a government agency pursuant to a 
lease . . . agreement. For all intents and purposes, COPS function like municipal 
bonds.”). 
 317. Id. 
 318. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2–12(b)(i)(C)(10) (2014). 
 319. Id.  
 320. See supra notes 190–193 and accompanying text (describing the 
creditworthiness test). 
 321. See supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text (discussing the TSC 
Industries materiality standard).  
 322. See Flachsbart, supra note 306, at 966 (explaining that, because COPs 
are fractional lease interests, they are ultimately property rights secured by the 
right of foreclosure).  
2036 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1989 (2015) 
the first scenario but different conclusions in the second scenario. 
Even though the creditworthiness test would not require the 
occurrence of the second example to be disclosed, the test targets 
bondholders’ main concern—whether the issuer will meet its 
obligations. The TSC Industries standard considers the event’s 
occurrence within the total mix of information, but the 
creditworthiness test considers whether the event’s occurrence 
substantially affects the issuer’s ability to meet its obligations.323 
Therefore, disclosures under the creditworthiness test will deliver 
information municipal bondholders need.324  
While it is unclear whether the creditworthiness test will 
provide more or fewer disclosures than the TSC Industries 
standard, under-disclosure and over-disclosure present problems 
for investors. The former does not provide enough material 
information to investors, and the latter provides too much 
information such that the investor loses material information 
among the trivial information.325 Finding the creditworthiness 
test’s place on this spectrum of under-disclosure and over-
disclosure can be challenging. Whether the creditworthiness 
increases or decreases the number of disclosures required of any 
given municipality, it is guaranteed to improve the flow of the 
most relevant information to bondholders.326 Further, as a “buy 
and hold” market, investors hold municipal bonds to receive the 
interest payments and principal when the bond matures.327 This 
test imparts to the investors the issuer’s creditworthiness 
throughout the bond’s lifetime. Thus, providing material 
information regarding the creditworthiness of an issuer 
accomplishes the goal of investor protection.328  
                                                                                                     
 323. See supra notes 247–266, 296–303 and accompanying text (explaining 
the TSC Industries materiality standard and the creditworthiness test in the 
context of municipal bonds). 
 324. See supra notes 296–303 and accompanying text (discussing the 
creditworthiness test in the context of municipal bonds). 
 325. See supra note 164 and accompanying text (providing the TSC 
Industries materiality standard).  
 326. See supra notes 76–83, 101 and accompanying text (describing the 
current problems with continuing disclosures in the municipal bond market and 
the need for increased transparency). 
 327. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (explaining that most retail 
bondholders hold their bonds until maturity). 
 328. See SEC Interpretive Release, supra note 67, at i (describing that the 
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 Issuer feasibility for a potential increase in disclosures is also 
a concern. Securities regulations balance investor protection by 
preventing burdensome regulation of issuers. Small issuers who 
rarely go to market with an offering may not have the resources 
to make more disclosures.329 Issuers also resist added disclosures 
because of the costs associated with making the disclosures and 
fear of potential liability related to disclosures.330 Even so, the 
amount of regulation issuers must follow remains minimal 
compared to publicly held corporations.331  
VI. Conclusion 
Overall, the SEC should adopt and apply the 
creditworthiness test to determine materiality in the context of 
Rule 15c2–12. Currently, municipal bond issuers have little 
guidance as to the meaning of materiality in this context and fail 
to provide important continuing disclosures. Municipal 
bondholders, whose primary concern pertains to issuers’ 
creditworthiness, need material information to evaluate and 
value municipal bonds. Disclosures concerning the issuers’ 
creditworthiness provide the critical information bondholders 
need and increase transparency in the municipal bond market. 
The municipal bond market’s unique structure—the SEC’s 
limited regulation and the differences from the corporate equity 
and debt markets—lends itself to application of a different 
materiality standard from the TSC Industries standard. The 
materiality standard should provide investor protection and 
recognize the municipal bond market’s needs. The 
creditworthiness test accomplishes both of these goals.  
                                                                                                     
SEC’s mission includes protecting investors, maintaining efficient markets, and 
facilitating capital formation). 
 329. See id. at 64 (expressing concern on smaller issuers’ limited resources 
to make more disclosures). 
 330. See SEC REPORT, supra note 8, at 12,755 (explaining that issuers are 
resistant to developing routine, ongoing disclosures). 
 331. See supra notes 46–64 and accompanying text (discussing that the 
Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the Tower Amendment exempt municipal 
bonds from the vast majority of the regulations). 
